Essays on Capital Flows, Saving, and Growth Acceleration by Wang, Boqun
Essays on Capital Flows, Saving, and Growth Acceleration
by
Boqun Wang
A dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Baltimore, Maryland
July, 2016
c© Boqun Wang 2016
All rights reserved
Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between international capital flows
and saving in periods of growth acceleration. High productivity growth is generally
associated with capital outflows in developing countries—a phenomenon called allo-
cation puzzle by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), who showed that it is due to the
behavior of saving rather than investment.
The first chapter paper adds habit formation to an otherwise-standard small open
economy Balassa-Samuelson model with frictions in an attempt to explain why coun-
tries generally increase saving and have a current account surplus when economic
growth accelerates. With plausible parameters, the model with habits can generate
an increase in saving and a current account surplus in the medium run. In contrast,
the standard model without habits predicts a sharp decrease in saving and a large
current account deficit. The higher saving in the model with habits also dampens the
real exchange rate appreciation compared with the no-habit model, because habit-
forming consumers cut the consumption of tradable goods in order to save.
High economic growth usually leads to high saving later. The second chapter
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revisits the growth and saving nexus studied by Carroll and Weil (1994). The robust-
ness of the Granger causality from growth to saving found by Carroll and Weil (1994)
is tested using data from different versions of the Penn World Table. This chapter
also examines the Granger causality from growth to saving in periods of empirically
defined growth accelerations. Saving increases in years within a growth acceleration
episode. However, the general statistical dependence of saving on growth is not driven
by those growth acceleration episodes.
Using provincial data from China, the third chapter (coauthored with Liuchun
Deng) examines the pattern of capital flows in relation to the transition of economic
regimes. We show that fast-growing provinces experienced less capital inflows before
the large-scale market reform, contrary to the prediction of the neoclassical growth
theory. As China transitioned from the central-planning economy to the market
economy, the negative correlation between productivity growth and capital inflows
became much less pronounced. From a regional perspective, this finding suggests
domestic institutional factors play an important role in shaping the pattern of capital
flows.
JEL classification: F31 O40 E21
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Acceleration, and Capital Flows
1.1 Introduction
The standard model would predict that capital should flow from low-growth devel-
oped countries to high-growth developing countries, the opposite of what data suggest
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013 [2]). Instead of saving at high rates and running a cur-
rent account surplus, fast-growing economies should borrow aggressively to finance
their investment and consumption needs, according to the textbook model. Further-
more, the real exchange rate appreciation is much more gradual in the data than pre-
dicted by the Balassa-Samuelson model in those fast-growing countries during their
growth acceleration periods (Harberger, 2003 [3]; Gente, 2006 [4]; Chuah, 2013 [5]).
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As an attempt to close the gap between the predictions of the standard model and
the empirical facts, this paper introduces habit formation into an otherwise-standard
small open economy model with nontradable goods. To explain the negative correla-
tion between economic growth and net capital inflows, a strong positive correlation
between growth and saving is needed.1 In this paper, we add consumption habits as
a way of generating the positive correlation between growth and saving.2 The model
with habits also better explains the real exchange rate dynamics, since the increase in
saving due to habit formation dampens the real exchange rate appreciation. To this
extent, this paper extends the insights from the following two strands of literatures:
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2] call the upstream capital flows the “allocation puz-
zle”, and argue that it is in fact a saving puzzle; Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) [6]
show that a model with consumption habits is able to generate causality from high
growth to high saving.3
This paper is mainly motivated by the discussion of the upstream capital flows and
the imbalances in the global economy observed since 2000. High saving and current
account surpluses as in the emerging countries are among the key stylized facts in both
the “allocation puzzle” and the global imbalances literature (Gourinchas and Jeanne,
2013 [2]; Von Hagen and Zhang, 2014 [10]; and etc.).4 However, most existing studies
1Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) [6] show that habits have the potential to generate causality
from growth to saving in an AK growth model. The applicability of their results to less specialized
production structures has not been thoroughly explored.
2Precautionary saving could be another possible way to generate the positive correlation between
growth and saving (Carroll and Jeanne (2013) [7]; Sandri, 2014 [8]; and etc.).
3Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] show that empirically growth Granger causes saving.
4In Section 1.3, we will examine this stylized pattern empirically by looking specifically at periods
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have focused on the role played by financial development or financial market frictions
in explaining the upstream capital flows (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008
[11]; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ŕıos-Rull, 2009 [12]; Angeletos and Panousi, 2011 [13];
and etc.). This paper adds one more perspective to the discussion by showing that
consumption habits can help explain the puzzle. Another dimension of the puzzle is
that the real exchange rate appreciates only gradually or even depreciates in the fast-
growing emerging countries.5 Increases of saving could depreciate the real exchange
rate and make it deviate from what the Balassa-Samuelson model would predict.6 As
we will show in this paper, adding habits is a way of bringing the model closer to the
observed behavior of the real exchange rate in growth acceleration episodes.
The main intuition why the habit model is capable of better matching the empir-
ical data compared with the model without habits is as follows. If the productivity
of the tradable goods sector in the economy increases, saving will increase as a conse-
quence of consumption habits formation. Unlike the consumer in a standard model, a
habit-forming consumer not only cares about the level of consumption but also cares
about the growth of consumption. Therefore, consumption will increase less than
the output, saving will increase, and the economy will run a current account surplus.
of fast economic growth.
5The New Mercantilism’s view is that the depreciated real exchange rate promotes economic
growth, either because it helps shift resources to manufacturing (Rodrik, 2008 [14]; Korinek and
Serven, 2010 [15]; Rabe, 2013 [16]; Wlasiuk, 2013 [17]; and etc.), or because it increases saving and
capital formation (Montiel and Luis Servén 2008, [18]; Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann,
2013 [19]; and etc.).
6For a discussion on this argument see Gente (2006) [4]; Du and Wei (2011) [20]; Christopoulos,
Gente, and Leon-Ledesma (2012) [21]; and etc.
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In addition, increases in saving will slow down the appreciation of the real exchange
rate predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson model. In the tradable-nontradable goods
model, the real exchange rate is the relative price of the nontradable goods in terms
of the tradable goods. Because nontradable goods have to be consumed domestically,
increases in saving will dampen the increase in tradable goods consumption. As a
result, the relative price of nontradable goods will rise only gradually, and the real
exchange rate will appreciate gradually.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a formal and plausible model
which allows for habit formation to shed light on why high economic growth is asso-
ciated with high saving, positive current account balance and gradual appreciation of
the real exchange rate. To be specific, we introduce consumption habits as modeled
in Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) [6] to a standard small open economy model
with nontradable goods. Another feature of our model is that we model the fact
that some countries’ growth takes off but other countries remain poor. There are
two regimes in the economy: In the convergence regime, the productivity of the trad-
able goods sector will converge towards a fraction of the world technology frontier;
in the non-convergence regime, the productivity will stagnate relative to the world
technology frontier. The two regimes evolve according to a two-states Markov pro-
cess. Although the model is very stylized, it is rich enough that we can examine the
dynamics of both the current account and the real exchange rate if economic growth
accelerates. We then calibrate the model to growth acceleration episodes in emerging
4
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markets and developing countries. Comparing the results from the calibrated model
with the stylized facts, we show that the model which allows for habit formation is
able to predict the qualitative pattern of current account surpluses in periods of high
economic growth. In contrast, the predictions from the simple model without habits
are wildly off.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews
the related literature; Section 1.3 provides stylized facts about saving, the current
account and the real exchange rate; Section 1.4 describes the small open economy
model with consumption habits and its solutions; Section 1.5 calibrates the model,
and compares the model predictions with the actual data; Section 1.6 concludes the
paper.
1.2 Literature Review
The paper is related to a number of different strands of literature. The first is
on the upstream capital flows (Lucas, 1990 [23]; Verdier, 2008 [24]; Gourinchas and
Jeanne, 2013 [2]; and etc.). It is also related to the research on global imbalances
(Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008 [11]; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ŕıos-Rull,
2009 [12]; and etc.). Capital flows from the fast-growing developing economies to the
developed economies. The seminal paper in this string of literature is that by Lucas
7If a model without habits was used, one would easily predict that China should be a debtor
instead of a creditor. For instance, Dollar, and Kraay (2006) [22] predicted that China’s Net Foreign
Asset (NFA) should be -17%.
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(1990) [23], in which he points out that there were too few capital flows from rich
countries to developing countries. There is, however, a subtle difference between the
“Lucas puzzle” and the “allocation puzzle”. To some extent, the “Lucas puzzle” is
more static, and a succinct description of it could be that the marginal products of
capital should be high in poor countries and should equalize;8 the “allocation puzzle”
is more dynamic, and the puzzle is that the fast-growing economies should borrow
from their future high income according to the neoclassical growth model. To put it
differently, the “allocation puzzle” is about the question of why high-growth coun-
tries do not receive more capital inflows given that they grow faster. Recently, people
have renewed interest in the topic as the positive correlation of economic growth and
capital outflows for non-OECD countries rises sharply and becomes higher than for
OECD countries (Yu, 2013 [26]). Yu (2013) [26] examines capital flows in both OECD
and non-OECD countries for the past three decades and finds that the correlation
between capital flows and economic growth changes over time. The positive correla-
tion of economic growth and capital outflows is actually more pronounced for OECD
countries, especially in the 80s. Chinn and Prasad (2003) [27] also find that there is a
strong positive relationship between GDP growth and the current account for indus-
trial countries using a sample between 1971-1995; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian
(2007) [28] find that capital outflows are positively correlated with economic growth in
non-industrial countries. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014) [29] decom-
8Caselli and Feyrer (2007) [25] find that marginal products of capital are remarkably similar
across countries if natural capital is separated from reproducible capital.
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pose the capital flows into private and public flows and find that the upstream capital
flows are mainly driven by public flows. Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel (2013) [30] show
that the key assumption of freely flowing capital is not supported in the data. They
also find that mainly private capital flows downhill in financially open economies.
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) [31] find that the “allocation puzzle”
is correlated to differences in the institutions of countries. Countries’ borders may
also be an important factor. Reinhardt (2012) [32] looks at the “allocation puzzle”
from a sectoral perspective. Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2010) [33]
find that capital flows are consistent with the neoclassical models within the states
of America.
Various explanations of the “allocation puzzle” and the global imbalances have
been discussed in the literature. The majority of the explanations focuses on the roles
played by the financial market. Von Hagen and Zhang (2014) [10] argue that the dif-
ferences in financial development explain the upstream capital flows. Caballero, Farhi,
and Gourinchas (2008) [11] argue that lacking the ability to supply financial assets is
the reason why capital flows from developing countries to the US. Mendoza, Quadrini,
and Ŕıos-Rull (2009) [12] think that the financial integration of countries with differ-
ent levels of financial development is the reason behind the global imbalances. An-
geletos and Panousi (2011) [13] show how introducing idiosyncratic entrepreneurial
risk could explain the global imbalances. Sandri’s (2014) [8] explanation is about
precautionary saving and the entrepreneurial risk associated with economic growth.
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When growth produces business opportunities, entrepreneurs with risky investment
contribute to the rise in saving. Because entrepreneurs face the uninsurable risk of
losing their investment, they have to rely on self-financing, and they increase their own
precautionary saving (Sandri, 2014 [8]). Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015) [34]
find that differential household credit constraints—more severe in fast-growing coun-
tries help explain the large net upstream capital flows and the divergence in private
saving rates between advanced and emerging economies. Other papers offer diverse
alternative perspectives.9 Buera and Shin’s (2009) [36] explanation for the “allocation
puzzle” is that a reform lifts the financial frictions and capital outflows are driven by
domestic saving seeking higher returns. Tornel and Velasco’s (1992) [37] story about
why capital flows from the poor countries to the rich countries explains that it is
because rich countries have safe bank accounts. Carroll and Jeanne (2013) [7] explain
the capital outflows from high-growth countries by the lack of social insurance which
stimulates precautionary saving. Jin (2012) [38] finds that a competing force that
capital tends to flow toward countries that are more specialized in capital-intensive
industries may explain the upstream capital flows if it dominates the standard force
that capital flows to where it is scarcer. Ju, Shi, and Wei (2012) [39] argue that trade
reform in a developing country would generally lead to a current account surplus.
9China’s current account surplus is an important contributor to the global imbalances. Thus,
people also consider Chinese-specific factors. For example, Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011)
[35] argue that the financial frictions and reallocation of resources across firms account for the current
account surpluses in China. State-owned firms have access to credit but are overrun by domestic
private firms. And as those state-owned firms shrink, a larger proportion of the domestic savings is
not channeled to them, but instead, invested in foreign assets.
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To understand why capital flows from the fast-growing developing countries to
developed countries is to understand why the fast-growing developing countries have
high saving and high current account surpluses. As argued by Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013) [2], the “allocation puzzle” is, in fact, a saving puzzle. There are a few expla-
nations as to why growth causes saving. Consumption habits proposed by Carroll,
Overland, and Weil (2000) [6] is a prominent one.10 Saving increases when growth is
higher because, with consumption habits, consumers only adjust their consumption
slowly. Life-cycle models and demographics changes have also been used to explain
how high growth leads to higher saving. The basic intuition is if the number or
the income of savers in the economy increases relative to the dis-savers, saving in
the economy could rise. But the explanation is not very successful in matching the
data. Using demographics changes is, at best, possible to produce a positive link from
growth to saving, but the size of this effect is small (Deaton and Paxson, 1997 [42],
2000a [43], 2000b [44]; Paxson, 1996 [45]). When Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin
(2015) [34] shut down the channel of demographics changes, their calibrated model
predicts essentially the same level of saving and current account surpluses, confirming
that the size of the demographics effect is small.
The paper is also related to papers that study the determinants of real exchange
rates. In the Balassa-Samuelson model, the real exchange rate is determined solely by
10Higher saving could lead to higher international reserves and international reserves could be
desirable. In Benigno and Fornaro (2012) [40], the reserve provides liquidity in crises time; and
in Aguiar and Amador’s (2011) [41] model, the economy accumulates international reserves due to
political economy frictions.
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the supply side: the relative productivity growth. There is an enormous amount of lit-
erature that studies the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Lee and Tang, 2007 [46]; Choudhri
and Schembri, 2010; [47]; Chong, Jordà, and Taylor, 2012 [48]; and etc.). But saving
may make the real exchange rate deviate from the level predicted by the Balassa-
Samuelson model. In Christopoulos, Gente, and Leon-Ledesma (2012) [21], as the
economy is constrained in the international capital market, domestic saving will af-
fect how real exchange rate depends on net foreign assets and productivity. A rise
in domestic savings will loosen the constraints. Gente (2006) [4] argues that falling
age dependency ratios offset partly the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Asian countries
such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore as they face constraints
on capital inflows, resulting in a small appreciation or even a depreciation. Du and
Wei (2011) [20] provide yet another novel and controversial theory as well as some
empirical evidence. They argue that an unbalanced sex ratio contributes to the real
exchange rate undervaluation by increasing saving and labor supply. Another part
of this strand of the literature examines how factor allocations between sectors affect
the real exchange rate (Morshed and Turnovsky, 2004 [49]; Chen and Hsu, 2009 [50];
and etc.). Morshed and Turnovsky (2004) [49] develop a model with intersectoral ad-
justment cost and analyze its implications for the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
Their model with sectoral adjustment cost is able to generate much more plausible
real exchange rate dynamics compared with empirical data. In general, with less than
perfect factor mobility, saving is linked to the real exchange rate.
10
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Lastly, the paper is also related to the literature about the consumption habits.
Consumption habits are introduced in a wide range of economics problems, and are a
key ingredient of this paper’s model.11 Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2010) [56]
study the persistent impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate consumption and
inflation persistence. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007) [57] find that pricing to
habits that firms charge different markups across markets exhibiting different ratios
of current to habitual demand can explain the deviation from the law of one price.
Gruber (2004) [58] adds consumption habits in studying the volatility of actual cur-
rent accounts. Wu (2011) [59] shows that all existing explanations to the Chinese
high saving fail if rising optimism about growth is incorporated, and suggests that
consumption habits model may help explain the rising Chinese saving.
1.3 Stylized Facts
What motivates this research in the first place are the stylized facts found in cross-
country empirical data that can not be explained by the textbook neoclassical model.
As we will show in this section, the cross-country data suggest that there are, in
fact, some general patterns about our key variables: saving, the current account, and
the real exchange rate, which apply to a large number of countries. To summarize,
11Fuhrer (2000) [51] uses consumption habits to better fit empirically the responses of consumption
and inflation to various shocks. Consumption habits are also used to explain the equity premium
puzzle (Sundaresan, 1989 [52]; Abel, 1990 [53]; Constantinides 1990 [54]; Campbell and Cochrane,
1999 [55]; etc.).
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there are three stylized empirical facts about saving, the current account and the real
exchange rate which will be discussed in this paper. The third fact is relatively less
well-known when people discuss the “allocation puzzle”.
1. High-growth countries typically run current account surpluses.
2. High-growth countries also experienced an increase in saving and investment.
3. The real exchange rate appreciated only gradually or even depreciated for high-
growth countries after the high growth started.
We examine the stylized facts mentioned above by studying the dynamics of sav-
ing, the current account and the real exchange rate in growth acceleration episodes
as identified by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) [1]. Increased saving and
current account surpluses in emerging economies have been part of the main motivat-
ing facts behind many papers in the literature. A growth acceleration episode is an
eight-year period when per-capita growth rate increases by more than 2 percentage
points, and the per-capita growth rate is more than 3.5 percent per year. In addition,
post-acceleration output needs to exceed the pre-episode peak level of income so that
pure recoveries are ruled out.12 This empirical definition is as close as possible to the
theoretic experiment of an increase in the tradable sector productivity which we will
consider in our model. The other data are from Penn World Table 7.1. The construc-
tion of the measure of real exchange rate follows Rodrik (2008) [14]. Real exchange
12The list of episodes are in the appendix (Table A.1).
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rate (RER) is calculated using exchange rates (XRAT) and purchasing power parity
conversion factors (PPP). Real exchange rate (RER) greater than one means that
the currency is more depreciated than indicated by purchasing power parity. In other
words, the log of real exchange rate (RER) greater than zero means that the currency
is more depreciated than indicated by the purchasing power parity.
lnRER = lnXRAT/PPP
The Balassa-Samuelson effect predicts that when a country has rapid productivity
improvement in the tradable goods sector, the real exchange rate will appreciate.
The changes of saving, investment, the current account, and log real exchange rate
in growth acceleration episodes are plotted in Figure 1.1.13 All the variables are
changes relative to their own means during years before the growth accelerations. For
example, saving rate is about 2.5% higher than before the growth acceleration i.e. if
the saving rate were 20% before the growth acceleration, it became 22.5% five years
after the growth accelerations. In growth acceleration episodes, saving increases more
than investment increases, and the current account thus increases. Rapid growth is
associated with both capital outflows and current account surpluses. Positive ln(RER)
changes mean that the real exchange rate is more depreciated than in previous years;
13Averaged over fourteen growth acceleration episodes from Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik
(2005) [1]. We also exclude episodes in which exogenous events which are not related to productivity
growth are likely to be influential. For example, foreign aid and credits are important for Egypt
in 1976; oil income is important for Algeria in 1975. Year 0 is the time when growth acceleration
starts.
13
CHAPTER 1. CONSUMPTION HABITS, GROWTH ACCELERATION, AND
CAPITAL FLOWS
negative values mean that the real exchange rate is more appreciated. The figure
shows that the real exchange rate depreciates during growth acceleration periods.14
1.4 A Small Open Economy Model with
Consumption Habits
In this section, consumption habits are introduced to an otherwise-standard small
open economy model. The model has a tradable goods sector and a nontradable goods
sector. The model is then used as a tool to think about the dynamics of saving, the
current account, and the real exchange rate in the period of productivity changes in
the tradable goods sector.
1.4.1 Model Set-up
Consider a small open economy where there are two goods: a tradable goods (T)
and a nontradable goods (N).15 By definition, the nontradable goods can only be
consumed domestically.
The representative consumer’s problem is to maximize her lifetime expected utility
14We also plot a similar figure adding developed countries. The resulting Figure A.1 is in the
appendix. The list of episodes are in the Table A.2
15Rabanal and Tuesta (2013) [60] show that adding nontradable goods is the key to understanding
real exchange rate fluctuations.
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βtU (Ct, Ht) (1.1)
where C is an aggregate consumption index; H is the stock of consumption habits; β
is the subjective discount factor.
The consumer cares not only about the level of the consumption but also about
how it compares to her habits. When she thinks about increasing her consumption,
though she likes more consumption, she does not like a sudden and huge deviation
from the old consumption level as she has a “habit” that adjusts only gradually. Her
stock of consumption habits evolves according to
Ht+1 −Ht = ρ (Ct −Ht) (1.2)
where ρ governs how quickly the stock of habits adjusts and how the past consumption
contributes to the consumption habits; to simplify the notations, choose the tradable
goods as the numeraire, and p is the price of the nontradable goods in terms of the
tradable goods.
The aggregate consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of tradable goods con-
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where CTt is the tradable goods consumption; CNt is the nontradable goods consump-
tion; coefficient θ gives the share of tradable goods consumption in the aggregate
consumption.16 The aggregate price index PC thus is
PC = p
1−θ
The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of the aggregate consump-
tion index between the home country and the foreign country. After some standard




The real exchange rate is a monotonic transformation of the relative price p. For
simplicity, in the later discussion we can analyze relative price or real exchange rate
interchangeably when necessary without causing confusion. Whenever relative price
p increases, real exchange rate appreciates.
The tradable and nontradable goods output YTt and YNt are produced with labor
LTt and LNt, and capital Kt. Assume that the tradable good sector uses capital and
labor but the nontradable goods sector only uses labor. Thus, the nontradable goods
sector can be thought as the “traditional” sector in the Lewis model. This model
16Cobb-Douglas specification is used in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) [61] when they discuss the
Balassa-Samuelson model. The Cobb-Douglas specification is also used in Morshed and Turnovsky
(2004) [49].
17Detailed derivations are in the appendix.
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setup allows the real exchange rate to be affected by demand factors. By definition,
nontradable goods have to be consumed domestically i.e. CNt = YNt. Tradable goods
consumption can be larger or smaller than its domestic output. When tradable goods
consumption is larger than its domestic output, the economy is a net importer; when
tradable goods consumption is smaller than its domestic output, the economy exports.









where ATt and ANt are the exogenous productivity level in the tradable and nontrad-
able goods sector; Kt is capital in the tradable goods sector.
If both the tradable and nontradable goods sector use Cobb-Douglas technology
to combine capital and labor into output, and capital and labor are freely mobile,
the real exchange rate or the relative price will be completely determined by the
supply side only. This is the Balassa-Samuelson model treated in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996) [61] and Rogoff (1992) [62].18 The key assumption is that capital and labor
can move freely across sectors. In order for demand to have an effect, some deviation
from the Balassa-Samuelson model has to be introduced. This is why we model the
nontradable goods sectors as the “traditional” sector which does not use capital.
18The details about the Balassa-Samuelson model are included in the appendix.
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The labor can not move internationally but can move between the two sectors.
Assume that the supply of labor is inelastic; and normalize total labor supply to 1.
Therefore, the labor in the tradable goods sector and the labor in the nontradable
goods sector in the domestic economy add up to 1,
LTt + LNt = 1. (1.5)
Assume that the productivity ATt in the tradable goods sector follows equation
(1.6), where vt can take two values: in the non-convergence regime, vt is equal to 1; in
the convergence regime, vt is equal to g < 1; Ā is a constant and represents the world
technology frontier.19 In the convergence regime, the tradable goods productivity
converges towards the technology frontier Ā.20 φ is a constant, and is between 0 and
1. When φ < 1, the tradable goods productivity of the economy will only converge
towards a fraction of the world technology frontier Ā.
ATt+1 = φĀ ∗ (1− vt) + vtATt (1.6)
Assume that vt evolves according to a two-state Markov process, and the transition
matrix for vt is Q, where q11 is the probability of staying at the non-convergence
regime; q12 is the probability of moving from the non-convergence regime to the
19One can think of this as the US level of tradable goods productivity.
20If Ā were allowed to grow at a constant level, all the steady-state variables will grow at the
same rate. Then, everything can be normalized by Ā. In the normalized model, the tradable goods
technology will again be a constant.
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convergence regime; q21 is the probability of moving from the convergence regime to






Only the tradable goods are used as investment goods. The investment law of
motion is standard as the following
It = Kt+1 −Kt + δKt (1.7)
Meanwhile, in order not to have jumps in capital and implausible numbers of
high investment, there should also be some cost to adjust capital between periods. A
rather standard assumption in the literature is to assume that capital accumulation
is subject to a convex adjustment cost (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003 [63]). The
budget constraint with capital adjustment cost is written as follows:




where parameter ξ controls the size of the adjustment cost; rt is the interest rate
faced by the small open economy if it borrows from the international capital market.
The changes in the external balance is the difference between saving and investment.
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Ht+T = 0 (1.10)
To induce stationarity, we assume that the interest rate depends on the amount
of external debt. From a technical point of view, this assumption makes the model
stationary in the sense that the steady state level of external balance does not depend
on its initial value and also is not path dependent. In addition, as argued in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2015) [64], theoretically it represents a simple way to capture
the presence of financial frictions; and empirically the debt-sensitive interest rates
are supported by the data. In particular, the interest rate faced by the small open
economy is
rt = r + p (Bt) (1.11)
where r is a constant world interest rate; p (•) is the country interest rate premium,
and is decreasing in its argument. In particular, assume the following function form
for p (•) as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) [63].
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where B̄ is the steady state level of the external balance, and ψ is a constant.
Although the introduction of the debt elastic interest rate is mainly for technical
purposes, the resulting changes in the interest rate will affect the dynamics of the
external balance, and therefore, also affect the dynamics of the current account. To
better examine how the existence of the consumption habits will affect the current
account and the external balance, a small value of ψ is chosen in the calibration so
that the effects from changes in the interest rate in the medium run will be small.
It is, however, worth to keep in mind of the existence of interest rate changes in the
model.
1.4.2 Equilibrium
Assume the utility function is taking the simple CRRA form and consumption
habits are multiplicative as in (1.12). As pointed out by Carroll (2000) [65], the
multiplicative habits and CRRA utility function are more appealing than other com-
binations of specifications, for example, subtractive habits and quadratic utility func-
tion. Coefficient γ controls how the consumer cares about the consumption habits.
If γ = 0, the consumer does not care about the consumption habits any more and
the model collapses to the simple case; If γ = 1 , the consumer only cares about the
ratio of current consumption to habits. σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
0 6 γ < 1 and σ > 1 is assumed.
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)1−θ − (1− ρ)Ht]
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(1.13)
The first-order conditions are the followings:21
21Detailed derivations are left in the appendix.
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λt (YNt − CNt) = 0 (1.16)
λt = βEt [λt+1 (1 + rt+1)] (1.17)
µt = βEt
[



















Tt+1 + 1− δ + ξ (Kt+2 −Kt+1)
]}
(1.19)
(1− αT )ATtKαt L−αTt = ptηANtL
η−1
Nt (1.20)
The first-order conditions are slightly more complicated than in the model without
consumption habits. If the consumption habits are removed, the above conditions
become the standard ones. Equation (1.16) is the nontradable goods market clearing
condition i.e. nontradable goods have to be consumed domestically. Equation (1.14)
is derived from the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the tradable goods
consumption. Equation (1.14) will not have the second term on the right-hand side
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in the simple model without habits i.e. µt is equal to zero. λt will be equal to the
marginal utility of tradable goods consumption, the first term on the right-hand side.
When λt is high, the marginal utility is high and the consumer is more willing to
increase the tradable goods consumption. In the habit model, µt is positive, and the
entire second term is negative. Thus, λt is lower in the habit model. The consumer
is less willing to increase her consumption. Using equation (1.14) and (1.15), we can





Equation (1.21) gives the price of nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods,
and carries the main intuition of how the real exchange rate is determined in the
model. The same equation arises for the model without consumption habits as well.
However, the existence of consumption habits will alter how tradable goods con-
sumption CTt responds to different shocks. In equilibrium, the market clearing in the
nontradable goods market means that the nontradable goods consumption is equal to
nontradable goods output. When the nontradable goods output does not change, if
the tradable goods consumption is lower, the relative price p will be lower as well. The
existence of consumption habits lowers the tradable goods consumption compared to
the case if there are no consumption habits, and that lowers the relative price p.
If there are no consumption habits, the jump in tradable goods consumption can
be much bigger. When the productivity in the tradable goods sector increases, the
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increase in the tradable goods consumption will be higher than the increase in the
tradable goods output and people will dis-save. This is the typical prediction of a
neoclassical model. When future income is higher, people will consume out of their
future income and saving will decrease.
The equilibrium of the small open economy consumption habits model is a set
of stochastic process {Bt, Ht, Kt, CTt, CNt, YTt, YNt, It, LTt, LNt, rt, pt, λt, µt} satisfy-
ing the FOC equations (1.14) - (1.20), equation (1.11), equations (1.3) - (1.5), the
transversality conditions equations (1.9) - (1.10) and budget equations (1.2) and (1.8)
, and given equation (1.6) and B0, H0, AT0, υ0, K0.
1.4.3 Numerical Resolution
The model is solved using the method in Richter, Throckmorton and Walker
(2014) [66]. They use policy function iteration with time iteration and linear inter-
polation and apply the method to a Markov switching RBC model. They make use
of the MATLAB Parallel Computing Toolbox (PCT) and integrate Fortran through
MATLAB executable functions (MEX) to significantly reduce the computing time.
They have made their codes publicly available.
First, grids are established for each states variables, Bt, Ht, ATt, Kt. Second, a
minimum set of variables required to solve for all time t variables are chosen as
numerical policies i.e. LTt, It, µt. The Lagrangian µt is chosen as a numerical policy,
which greatly simplifies the calculation. Third, initial conjectures for each policy
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function are obtained. After obtaining the initial guesses, all time t variables are
solved using all of the equilibrium conditions i.e. CTt, CNt, YTt, YNt, LNt, rt, pt, λt.
Next, the time t+ 1 values for each of the policy variables are calculated using linear
interpolation. Then, the remaining time t + 1 variables that need to calculate time
t expectations are solved using the discrete Markov chain. Finally, then zeros of
the equations with embedded expectations are solved. The output are values for the
updated policy functions for the next iteration. When the distance between the initial
policy values and the updated policy values is less than the convergences criterion on
all nodes, the policies have converged to their equilibrium values.22
1.5 Calibration and Simulation
The calibration of the model is aimed to help illustrate the qualitative performance
of the model, and to produce the baseline predictions and intuitions. Whether the
model can generate numbers of plausible magnitudes is also examined.
1.5.1 Calibrating Model Parameters
First, let us start with the parameters whose calibration is more standard and
need not much discussion. The time unit of the model is chosen to be a year. The
world interest rate r is set to 4%. The subjective discount factor is set equal to
22More details of the numerical algorithm are in the appendix.
26
CHAPTER 1. CONSUMPTION HABITS, GROWTH ACCELERATION, AND
CAPITAL FLOWS
the constant world interest rate i.e. β = 1
1+r
. The capital share in the production
function in the tradable sector α is chosen to be 0.32. This is a typical number chosen
in the literature (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003 [63]). The depreciation rate δ is 6%.
The tradable consumption share is chosen to be 0.3526 from Benigno, Chen, Otrok,
Rebucci and Young (2013) [67]. The productivities of the nontradable goods and
tradable goods are normalized to be 1. The steady-state external balance level is
assumed to be 0.
1.5.1.1 AT Process
Different values of g imply different convergence paths and time-varying growth
rates of the tradable goods productivity AT (Figure 1.2). For any given g, the value
vt takes in the convergence regime, the growth rate of AT is high at the beginning
and gradually decreases. When g is smaller, the initial growth rate is higher, and the
mean growth rate is also higher. But there is a general trade-off between matching the
initial growth rate and the mean growth rate. In the data, the average TFP growth
in the growth acceleration episodes is less than 4%; the average TFP growth in the
non-growth-acceleration years is close to zero and slightly negative. g is equal to 0.9
to roughly match the mean TFP growth rate difference between growth acceleration
episodes and the non-growth-acceleration years. In Figure 1.3, the TFP growth in
the data and in the model are compared. In the following numerical exercise, the
initial level of tradable goods productivity AT0 is chosen to be 50% of the technology
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frontier level. In PWT 8.1, the mean and the median of the TFP at current PPPs
for all the developing countries, real GDP per capita less than 6000 PPP dollars, are
about 0.5. The US level is normalized to 1. q12 is the probability of moving from the
non-convergence regime to the convergence regime. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik
(2005) [1] calculate that the unconditional probability of a country will experience
a growth acceleration sometime during a decade is 0.25. q12 is the probability of a
growth acceleration in a year. If the occurrence of a growth acceleration in any year is
independent, the probability of a growth acceleration in a decade is 10q12 (1− q12)9.
So q12 should be equal to 0.034. q21 is the probability of moving from the convergence
regime to the non-convergence regime. The length of a growth acceleration episode
is about 10 years on average in the data. q21 is therefore chosen to be 1/10. φ is
chosen to be 0.85 i.e. the economy actually converges towards 85% of the technology
frontier. In PWT 8.1, the mean and the median of the TFP at current PPPs for all
the developed countries, countries with real GDP per capita more than 6000 PPP
dollars, are about 0.85. If an average developing country converges toward an average
developed country, the productivity will converge to about 85% of the US productivity
which is considered to be at the world technology frontier.
1.5.1.2 Habit Parameters
The habit persistence parameter ρ is chosen to be 0.2 as in Carroll, Overland and
Weil (2000) [6]. The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is set to 2 for the model with-
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out habits, which is standard in the literature (e.g. Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008 [68];
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003 [63]; Stockman and Tesar, 1995 [69]; and etc.). The
habit parameter is γ = 0.8. Deaton (1994) [70] and Constantinides (1990) [54] both
require the habit parameter γ to be around 0.8; Gruber (2004)’s [58] average esti-
mate of γ is slightly over 0.8. Fuhrer (2000) [51]’s estimate of γ is 0.9 using GMM. To
summarize, a value of γ around 0.8 or even higher has been considered as plausible in
the literature. Consumption habits create a discrepancy between the short-horizon
and the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consumption habits
increase the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When the habit
parameter γ is changed, the choice of the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ will
also need to be adjusted. Together, they determine the long-horizon intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
bigger than the short-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution (the inverse of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion 1/σ) in the model with habit formation. In ad-
dition, the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger if the habits
are stronger. Given the same value of the habit parameter γ, a higher value of σ is
more likely to generate a current account surplus because an increase in σ is going to
increase the discrepancy between the long-horizon and the short-horizon intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution, the ratio of the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of
substitution to the short-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution.23 Although
23However, it will only affect the transition since the steady state current account is always zero
in this model.
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a higher σ will decrease both the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the short-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution, it decreases the short-
horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution more. So relatively speaking, when σ
is higher, the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger compared
to the short-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It actually increases the
long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution relatively. Thus, the consumer
is more willing to cut consumption now and enjoy a better consumption growth in
the short future. In the current model, there is not a simple analytical formula for
the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The interest rate rt is also
time-varying. However, in Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) [6], the long-horizon
intertemporal elasticity of substitution has an explicit analytical expression, which is
equal to 1
γ(1−σ)+σ . As a crude approximation, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
σ is chosen to be 11 for the habit model using 1
γ(1−σ)+σ .
1.5.1.3 Debt Elasticity of the Country’s Interest Rate Pre-
mium
The debt elasticity of the country’s interest rate premium ψ is another important
parameter. It affects how quickly interest rate will respond to changes in the external
balance. If the economy runs a current account surplus and accumulates more external
balance, the interest rate will decrease to move the external balance back to the steady
state level; and vice versa. A large value of ψ means that the interest rate changes
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will be large and it will take less time for the external balance to return to its steady
state level. In the baseline calibration, ψ is chosen to be 0.00001 as in Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2001) [71]. A small ψ is desirable as it will mean that medium-run current
account dynamics will not be affected much by the interest rate changes. Meanwhile,
the external balance will return to the steady state slowly. The primary focus of
the current paper is not how interest rate premium affects current account and the
external balance.
1.5.1.4 Capital Parameters
The parameter η mainly determines the steady state employment share in the
tradable goods sector.24 η is 0.8535 and the implied steady state employment share
in the tradable goods sector is 35%. Considering that the steady state technology
is 85% of the US level approximately, 35% gives a number very close to the actual
employment share in the tradable goods sector estimated in Hlatshwayo and Spence
(2012) [73]. The parameter ξ determines how costly to accumulate capital over time.
The calibrated value for ξ varies a lot in the literature ranging from 0.3 to 20 (Jin,
2012 [38]). In this paper, ξ is chosen so that approximately the changes of investment
rate produced by the model are of similar magnitude compared with the changes of
investment rates in Figure 1.1. The resulting ξ is 15.
24The employment share in the tradable goods sector in reality is changing and has important
implications (Hlatshwayo and Spence, 2013 [72]; Hlatshwayo and Spence, 2012 [73]). But this is
beyond this paper.
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With the above calibrated parameters (Table 1.1), the time paths of all the key
variables can be calculated numerically.
1.5.2 The Tradable Sector Productivity Conver-
gence
Now, let us examine a permanent improvement in the tradable goods sector pro-
ductivity. Suppose that at time 0, the economy has been in the steady state, and the
tradable goods productivity of the economy is at a level of AT0. Then because, for
example, an exogenous economic reform happened, the economy moves to the conver-
gence regime and stays in the convergence regime for the coming years. The tradable
goods sector productivity thus will converge towards a fraction of the higher steady-
state level Ā from the initial level AT0. The experiment can be thought of an average
developing country converging towards an average developed country. We want to
compare how the current model’s predictions are different from the predictions of the
model without the consumption habits.
1.5.2.1 Baseline Calibration
The results using the baseline calibration are plotted in Figure 1.4. The red
dash line is for the simple model without habits; and the blue solid line is for the
model with habits and γ = 0.8. The consumption habits slow the adjustment of the
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tradable goods consumption, and this increases saving. The jump in the tradable
goods consumption is smaller for the model with habits. In the habit model, as the
demand for tradable goods is higher, labor will move to the tradable goods sector
and the increase in investment is also larger.25
The dynamics for the model without habits and with habits differ in important
ways. The current account dynamics are very different. The current account surplus
reaches slightly more than 2.5% after six years in the habit model; the current account
deficits reach nearly 20% initially, and remain more than 8% after ten years in the
model without habits.26 As a consequence of the current account dynamics, there is
an increase in the external balance in the habit model but there is a big drop in the
external balance for the model without habits. The reason that the responses of the
current account and the external balance are different is because the tradable goods
consumption adjusts differently. When there are consumption habits, the consumer
increases tradable goods consumption by less.27
The intuition as to why the model with habits predicts a much more gradual in-
crease in the tradable goods consumption is basically the same as in Carroll, Overland,
25Note only tradable goods are used as investment.
26In order for the external balance of the simple model to return to the steady state level, the
economy has to run equal amount of current account surpluses some times in the distant future.
27The current account dynamics are also influenced by how the risk premium adjusted interest
rate changes. The dynamics of the risk premium adjusted interest rate drive the external balance
back to the long run steady state level. However, because a small value of debt elasticity of country
interest rate premium ψ is chosen, it will take a long time for the external balance to return to its
steady-state level. For example, in the case of the simple model, if the external balance decreases,
the interest rate paid on the external balance will increase. A higher interest rate will then increase
the accumulation of the external balance, and eventually drive the external balance to return to the
steady state.
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and Weil (2000) [6]. The reason that saving increases is because the habit-forming
consumers not only smooth levels of consumption but also smooth growth of consump-
tion . A different perspective is that consumption habits increase the long-horizon
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. With stronger habits, the consumer is more
willing to substitute today’s consumption for future consumption growth. As a re-
sult, the simple model without habits predicts the sharpest increase of the tradable
goods consumption, and therefore, the biggest current account deficit and the biggest
drop of the external balance. The model predictions of the current account and other
variables are compared with the data in Figure 1.5. The model with habits does a
much better job in matching the data.
The real exchange rate appreciation is slower in the habit model. Or to put it
differently, the increase of relative price is slower. The initial appreciation of the real
exchange rate is 51% smaller in the model with habits compared with the simple model
without habits. After ten years, the real exchange rate is still 6% more depreciated
in the model with habits compared with the simple model without habits. Compared
with the long-run steady state, the real exchange rate is 21% more depreciated in
the model with habits than in the simple without habits.28 The reason can be best
understood using equation (1.21). The increase of tradable goods consumption is
much smaller in the habit model. The increase of relative price is thus also smaller.
Because the nontradable goods are consumed completely domestically, if the amount
28The data suggest that the real exchange rate actually depreciates slightly. One possibility is
that other factors that are not considered in the stylized model also affect the dynamics of the real
exchange rate, for instance, the New Mercantilism motives.
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of tradable goods consumption is large, the nontradable goods are relatively more
scarce, and its price will go up. On the contrary, when the demand of tradable goods
is weaker and the amount of tradable goods consumption is smaller, the nontradable
goods will be less expensive relatively.
1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We vary a few key parameters in this section to see how they affect the resulting
dynamics of our key variables. This exercise could also provide further intuition on the
channels driving the dynamics of our key variables. In particular, we investigate the
role played by the habit parameter γ, the capital adjustment cost parameter ξ, and
the coefficient of relative risk aversion parameter σ. We also examine how the results
may differ if the probability of growth acceleration is calibrated differently. Figure
1.6 plots the dynamics of saving, investment, current account, and real exchange rate
if the habit parameter γ is different. It is not surprising that as habit parameter γ
is closer to 0, the dynamics are more similar to the model without habits. The habit
parameter γ needs to be big enough in order to produce a current account surplus.
Figure 1.7 plots the results if different capital adjustment cost parameters ξ are
assumed. A higher value of ξ will lower the initial increase in investment as expected.
However, the effect on the current account is relatively small. The model predicts a
current account surplus after about five years in all cases.
Figure 1.8 shows how different coefficients of relative risk aversion parameters σ
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would affect our results. As discussed in calibrating the habit parameter, higher σ in-
creases saving and current account because it increases the long-horizon intertemporal
elasticity of substitution relatively. The consumer becomes more willing to postpone
her consumption.
Another possible concern is that the probabilities in the transition matrix might
be inaccurately calibrated.29 Our simple model specifes a tractable and stylied two-
regime Markov process that growth accelerates in the convergence regime. On the one
hand, the actual data generating process of the growth acceleration could be much
more complicated; on the other hand, correctly identifying the growth acceleration
in the data could be difficult. For example, there could be growth accelerations that
last for only one or two years in the model.30 But it will be difficult to identify short
growth accelerations in the data as the influence of business cycles is hard to exclude.
Figure 1.9 shows that how sensitive different calibrations of the probability of growth
acceleration will affect the results. The dynamics do not change much.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a formal small open economy model with consumption habits
to describe the medium-run dynamics of saving, the current account and the real
29Our Monte Carlo simulations show that the unconditional probability of growth accelerations
and the average length of growth accelerations produced by the Markov process in the model match
the data counterpart as expected.
30This model feature may be very unrealistic. In reality, because building factories and infras-
tructures takes time, it is hard to imagine that growth acceleration that depends on productivity
advancement could happen in one year and go away in the next.
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exchange rate when economic growth accelerates. Our habit model shows that saving
is key to study the dynamics of the current account and the real exchange rate in the
course of economic growth acceleration, and therefore, it offers a possible perspective
to connect different strands of the related literature. High growth leads to high saving
and a current account surplus; and high saving slows down the real exchange rate
appreciation.
Developing countries started to run current surpluses together at the same time
when the economic growth in those countries took off. However, a rational represen-
tative consumer has a very strong incentive to borrow from the future to consume
if she knows that she will be richer in the future. This is puzzling. The introduc-
tion of consumption habits into the small open economy model, at least, brings the
standard model’s predictions closer to the data. The habit model predicts a more
positive external balance if the habits are strong enough. But, habits may only be
able to bring us so far. For instance, the habit model is not able to generate the real
exchange rate depreciation, though it predicts a more gradual appreciation.31 To this
extent, consumption habits might not be the complete answer to the question. The
unanswered part of the question is, however, beyond this paper and therefore left out
for future research.
31The New Mercantilism motive could be one reason for the real exchange rate depreciation.
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Note: The changes of each variables are calculated as the difference relative to its mean level before growth
accelerations happened
Source: PWT 7.1
Figure 1.1: Changes in saving, investment, the current account, and ln(RER) during
growth acceleration episodes (averages across 14 episodes)
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Figure 1.2: Calibrate AT
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Figure 1.3: Compare TFP growth in the data and in the model
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Figure 1.4: Saving, investment, current account and real exchange rate in conver-
gence regime
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Figure 1.5: Compare saving, investment, current account, and real exchange rate
in the model and in the data
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Figure 1.6: Sensitivity: different habit parameter γ
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Figure 1.7: Sensitivity: different capital adjustment cost ξ
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Figure 1.8: Sensitivity: different coefficient of relative risk aversion parameter σ
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Figure 1.9: Sensitivity: different probability of growth acceleration
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subjective discount factor β = 1/1.04
relative risk aversion σ = 2, 11
weights on habits γ = 0, 0.80
tradable consumption share θ = 0.3526, Benigno et al. (2013) [67]
habit persistence ρ = 0.2, Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) [6]
world interest rate r = 0.04
debt elasticity of country interest rate premium ψ = 0.00001, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) [71]
steady state external balance level B̄ = 0
tradable and nontradable productivity AT = AN = 1
non-convergence to convergence regime q12 = 0.034
convergence to non-convergence regime q21 = 1/10
fraction of technology frontier φ = 0.85
nontradable production parameter η = 0.8535
capital adjustment cost ξ = 15
capital income share α = 0.32, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) [63]
Table 1.1: Calibration Parameters
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Chapter 2
Growth Acceleration and High
Saving
2.1 Introduction
It is a long-standing question for economists to understand the substantial increase
in the national saving of an economy. Among various explanations of high saving,
high economic growth is the explanation suggested by Carroll and Weil (1994) [9].
High growth is a good predictor of high saving later on. In this paper, we first repeat
the analysis of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] but use more recent data and test the
robustness of their results. Then, we extend the results of the study of Carroll and
Weil (1994) [9] by focusing on periods of empirically defined growth accelerations. We
show that the statistical relationship that high growth is associated with high saving
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is not statistically different in growth acceleration episodes.
Almost all countries that experience high economic growth also have a high and
rising saving rate during the high growth period. Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] document
the cross-country statistical fact that high economic growth is associated with high
saving. They show that growth Granger-causes saving but saving does not Granger-
cause growth using macro data;1 and that households with predictably high income
growth save more than those with low income growth using micro data.2
The observation that a period of high economic growth is also a period of high
saving leads us to directly look at those episodes where economic growth is high
and accelerates. One may wonder whether the results of the research of Carroll
and Weil (1994) [9] are driven by those special episodes. Hausmann, Pritchett, and
Rodrik [1] provide an interesting and simple algorithm to empirically identify cross-
country growth acceleration episodes. With those growth acceleration episodes at
hand, we can study the relationship between growth and saving during those special
periods of time. It would be interesting to know whether the relationship between
growth and saving displays some nonlinearity that the causality going from growth
to saving is different in growth acceleration episodes. Is the Granger causality driven
by those growth acceleration episodes?
1They used the Summers and Heston (1991) Mark 5 data and then excluded all countries whose
data received a grade of lower than ”C−”, communist countries, countries whose economies were
dominated by oil production, and countries with 1985 populations of less than one million; they also
used the OECD countries with 1985 populations of greater than one million.
2They used three household surveys, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the 1961–1962 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
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To present our main results, we need to first define growth acceleration. Growth
acceleration is defined empirically by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) [1]. A
growth acceleration episode is an 8-year period where per capita growth increases by
more than 2 percentage points, and the postacceleration growth rate is more than 3.5
percent per year. In addition, postacceleration output needs to exceed the pre-episode
peak level of income so that pure recoveries are ruled out. Hausmann, Pritchett,
and Rodrik’s (2005) [1] method identifies most of the well-known episodes of growth
acceleration, such as Argentina, 1990; Mauritius, 1971; Korea, 1962; Indonesia, 1967;
Brazil, 1967; and Chile 1986; and so on.
Using the empirical definition of growth acceleration, the relationship between
saving and growth is analyzed in those growth acceleration episodes. In summary,
our basic results are as follows: First, saving increases by 2% in 9 years after growth
accelerates (e.g, 20% to 22%). Second, the Granger causality of high growth to high
saving is not statistically different in those growth acceleration episodes. There are
no significant differences between the coefficient estimates on lagged growth in saving
regressions using the full sample and using only observations after growth accelerates.
We also apply our general analysis and results to a few country cases, and discuss
each country’s history of growth and saving. Although various explanations that rely
on countries’ specifics could be proposed to explain their high saving, our results at
least suggest that there might be more fundamental economic forces that explain
the high saving. It is certainly true that countries’ specifics are important, but it
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is equally likely that there are also common factors. In other words, if a general
explanation is successful to account for part of one country’s high saving, it hopefully
will also explain part of the high saving in another country. Japan and Korea are
two interesting country examples that experienced high growth and high saving in
the past. We will take a closer look at these two countries. Further discussions are
in Section 2.4.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly reviews the
related literature. In Section 2.3, we present our main cross-country evidence. In
Section 2.4, we discuss a few case examples to illustrate how results in Section 2.3
can apply to individual countries, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
A famous quote by W. Arthur Lewis (1954, p. 155) [74] states that the “central
problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by which
a community which was previously saving...4 or 5 percent of its national income or
less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to
15 percent of national income or more.”There are two related but distinct motivations
to study the relationship between saving and growth. The first one is to understand
the low-frequency implications of the permanent income theory or the life cycle model.
The second is to understand how important the factor accumulation is for economic
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development, which is more relevant here. In the Lewis model, when there are more
capitalists in the dualism economy, the saving will rise and the standard of living will
improve.
The main question is whether saving causes growth or growth causes saving. It is a
well-known fact that growth and saving are positively correlated. The average saving
and the average growth over many decades are plotted in Figure 2.1, which helps
illustrate that saving and growth are positively correlated. If a linear line is fitted,
the regression coefficient will be positive and highly statistically significant. However,
whether putting growth or saving on the left-hand side of the regression does not
make growth or saving more likely to cause the other. Modigliani is right that the
key to saving is growth, not thrift; Modigliani (1987) [75] wrote “When a country
needs capital to drive rapid growth, capital will be forthcoming.” Carroll and Weil
(1994) [9] find that growth is Granger-causing saving to increase. Attanasio, Picci,
and Scorcu (2000) [76] and Yi and Yang (2014) [77] find similar results. Blomstrom,
Lipse, and Zejan (1996) [78] provide similar evidence for investment that high growth
precedes increase in fixed investment. Their regression is similar to that of Carroll and
Weil (1994) [9] except that they use investment instead of saving. The conventional
thinking of how saving causes growth implicitly assumes that saving will automatically
translate into investment and investment will lead to growth. There is evidence that
supports this view of saving and investment relation. Domestic saving rates even
among industrial countries account for much of the differences in investment rates
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(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980 [79]; Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991 [80]).3 Aghion,
Comin, and Howitt (2012) [82] have made a recent effort to revive the idea that saving
leads to growth. They provide an interesting theory model in which saving causes
growth. The reason is that saving leads to more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by
solving a moral hazard problem. However, the consensus is on the other direction of
the causality. After reviewing the evidence in decades of past studies and practices,
Easterly and Levine (2001) [83] reached the conclusion that the proposition of saving
causing growth is decisively rejected. Most cross-country income differences and
growth differences are explained by “something else”—the Total Factor Productivity
(TFP)—rather than factor accumulation.
There are a number of reasons why growth could cause saving to rise. In a stan-
dard representative consumer model, higher future growth is going to reduce current
saving because the consumer will want to borrow from the future to increase the
current consumption. Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) [6] have introduced con-
sumption habits into the standard model and offered one promising way to explain
how growth can cause saving. Saving increases when growth is higher because, with
consumption habits, consumers only adjust their consumption slowly. Evidence of
consumption habits is found at the aggregate level. Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer
(2008) [84] find that aggregate consumption growth is sticky, which reflects consump-
tion habits. But the difficulty is that there is no strong evidence to support consump-
3In a close economy, saving is equal to investment; in an open economy, domestic residents may
have a significant “home-country bias” in investment portfolios (Tesar and Werner, 1995 [81]).
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tion habits in the micro data (Dynan, 2000 [85]). There are a few other explanations
why growth could cause saving to rise. Consumers may care about consumption as
well as wealth (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite, 1992 [86]). The life cycle model and
demographic changes have also been considered. A version of the life cycle model
could generate the causality from growth to saving. If it is assumed that income
growth happens between cohorts, theoretically, growth can increase aggregate saving.
The basic intuition is simple and sensible. If the number or the income of savers in
the economy increases relative to the dissavers, saving in the economy could rise. But
Carroll and Summers (1991) [87] and Deaton (1989) [88] find that this explanation
is not supported by empirical evidence. Demographic changes are another candidate.
Although demographic changes can produce a positive link from growth to saving,
the explanatory power is small. See, for example, Deaton and Paxson (1997) [42]
(2000a) [43], (2000b) [44], and Paxson (1996) [45]. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) [89]
provide an alternative story where liquidity constraints on household raise the saving
rate and strengthen the effect of growth on saving. When growth is higher, people
have more income when they are middle-aged, but they cannot borrow fully to con-
sume this increase in income when they are young, resulting in the rise in saving.
Sandri (2014) [8] offers another explanation based on precautionary saving from en-
trepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who face uninsurable risk of losing their investment have
to rely on self-financing, and they increase their own saving when growth produces
risky investment opportunities. Lack of social safety net and precautionary saving
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The data we use come from various versions of the Penn World Table (PWT).
Both data from the first-generation PWT and the second-generation PWT are used.4
The sample selection criteria follow exactly Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] to enhance a
direct comparison between our results and the results of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9].
We exclude all countries that have a most recent population of less than one million
as well as countries with observations of less than 20. In the appendix of the PWT
6.0, countries’ estimates in PWT 6.0 are given a letter grade to signal the relative
reliability of the estimates according to three factors: (1) the number of benchmark
comparisons a country had entered; (2) its income level, because within benchmarks it
has been found that the margin of error is greater for low-income countries; and (3) for
nonbenchmark countries, the sensitivity of their estimates. We include only countries
that have a grade “C” or above. In addition, we exclude all communist countries
and OPEC countries that are affected by the fluctuation of oil prices.5 Although the
4The first generation includes PWT 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7.0 and 7.1; the second generation includes
PWT 8.0 and 8.1.
5Whether China is included or not will not affect our conclusion.
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data can go back to as early as 1950, we decide to restrict our sample period to from
1960 to the most recent data available given that the data in earlier years are less
trustable.6
2.3.2 Granger Causality Test of Saving and Growth
The existing literature has pointed out that the Granger causality goes from
growth to saving.7 The formal empirical test follows exactly Carroll and Weil (1994)
[9]. Since Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] published their paper, a number of new versions
of the PWT data are now available, with more countries and more years. Possibly the
data quality also improves over time. It will be good to know whether the Granger
causality that goes from growth to saving found by Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] still
holds when different versions of the PWT data are used. To test the robustness of
the results of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9], the basic empirical strategy is to run the
following pair of regressions:
Git = αGi + ηGt + γGSit−1 + εit
Sit = αSi + ηSt + γSGit−1 + εit
where Sit−1 is lagged saving rate and Git−1 is lagged growth rate. The Granger
causality test is to test whether γ is statistically different from zero. The subscript
6The results are not sensitive to sample periods, and results for 1950–2007 are also available.
7For example, Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] and Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (2000) [76], and etc.
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of γ labels whether the dependent variable of the regression is growth or saving. If
γG is statistically different from zero, we say that S is Granger-causing G; if γS is
statistically different from zero, we say that G is Granger-causing S. It is possible that
neither variable Granger-causes the other, or that each of the two variables Granger-
causes the other. The Granger causality is best thought as a test of predictability. For
example, if γS is significantly different from zero, it means that past high economic
growth will predict high saving later. To remove the business cycle influences, all
the variables are in non-overlapping 5-year moving average. αGi and αSi are country
fixed effects; ηGt and ηSt are time fixed effects.
The regression results are reported in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Table 2.1 presents
the saving regressions, and Table 2.2 presents the growth regressions. The column
names indicate whether the dependent variable is saving or growth. Different columns
report the pairs of Granger causality tests using data from all the different versions
of the first-generation PWT. For example, Column 3 of Table 2.1 reports the saving
regression using data from PWT 6.3. The coefficient for lagged growth is highly
significant at 5%, which means that growth Granger-causes saving to rise. This
finding is robust across all versions in the first-generation PWT. In addition, the
coefficients are oftentimes more significant. For instance, the growth coefficients in
the saving regressions are significant at 1% using data from PWT 6.2 and PWT
7.1. At the same time, all of the R-squares in the saving regressions are very high
across different columns, suggesting that a large portion of the variations in saving
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rates is captured by the regressions. The R-square is around 0.9, and the smallest
R-square is 0.886 in Column 4 of Table 2.1. On the other hand, the coefficient for
lagged saving in the growth regression is insignificant for PWT 6.2; the coefficients
are significant but negative for PWT 6.1, PWT 6.3, PWT 7.0, and PWT 7.1 (Table
2.2). Especially, they are significant at 1% for PWT 7.0 and PWT 7.1. Saving
does not seem to Granger-cause growth to rise, and even Granger-causes growth
to fall.8 Results in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 provide strong evidence to show that
Carroll and Weil’s (1994) [9] findings are robust. The finding that growth Granger-
causes saving to rise is robust. The direct way to interpret the results is that high
economic growth will predict high saving later. On the other hand, the alternative
way to interpret the regression results is to use a model of habit formation. As shown
by Alessie and Lusardi (1997) [91], in a consumption model with habit formation,
current saving depends on past saving, and income changes under the assumption of
quadratic preferences and additive consumption habits. Thus, the regression results
can be thought of as also lending support for the consumption model with habit
formation.
Table 2.3 reports results using data from the second-generation PWT. Column 1
through Column 4 report the same pair of Granger causality regressions as in Table
2.1 and Table 2.2. Column 1 reports saving regression, and Column 2 reports the
growth regression using data from PWT 8.0; and Column 3 and Column 4 use data
8The result does not mean that high saving will decrease growth. The result suggests that high
saving does not precede high growth.
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from PWT 8.1. PWT 8.1 is the latest version of the PWT data. The coefficients
of lagged growth in the saving regression are not significant in both Column 1 and
Column 3. Column 5 and Column 6 provide one additional control, the income level
in the previous 5 years as suggested by the regressions from Aghion, Comin, and
Howitt (2012) [82]. The coefficient of lagged growth in the saving regression is not
significant, either. The specifications are exactly the same. It is puzzling why the
significance disappears in the second-generation PWT. We may start by excluding
a few possible reasons. First, the regressions using PWT 7.1 and PWT 8.0 contain
essentially the same set of countries. The reason is not that the second-generation
PWT includes different sets of countries. Second, if we compare the regressions using
PWT 7.1 and PWT 8.0, they also contain the same set of years. Although PWT
8.0 contains one additional year, the additional year did not enter the regressions
because all variables are in a 5-year moving average. We can also exclude another
possibility. The second-generation PWT did not include the shares of C, I, and G
at constant prices (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015 [92]). However, the results
using the shares of C, I, and G at constant prices for the first-generation PWT do
not change qualitatively. The coefficients of lagged growth in the saving regressions
are still significant across different versions if the shares of C, I, and G at constant
prices are used. The methodology for calculating the relative price is different from
the first-generation PWT to the second-generation PWT, which drives the differences
in other variables. Table 2.4 reports the saving regressions using different real GDP
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measures constructed from different relative prices in the second-generation PWT.
Column 1 and Column 2 use real GDP at chained PPP; Column 3 and Column 4
use real GDP at current PPP; Column 5 and Column 6 use the RGDPNA variable
which is constructed using growth rate of real GDP from the national accounts. As
commented by Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) [92], RGDPNA is the closest to
real GDP as reported in past versions of PWT. The coefficients of lagged growth are
highly significant in Column 5 and Column 6 but not in other columns. Thus, it seems
that the ways the second-generation PWT constructs the real GDP measures are the
reason that changes the Granger causality results. However, the exact mechanism is
not clear. On the other hand, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2016) [93] find that the
newer generation of the PWT is not necessarily better. It could be an interesting
separate paper to understand better why the results are no longer significant moving
to the second-generation PWT.
Another interesting comparison is between the East Asian countries and the East-
ern European countries. One important difference between these two sets of countries
is the availability of credits. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report the saving regressions us-
ing only East Asian countries or using only Eastern European countries. The notable
difference is that the coefficients of the lagged growth are positive and sometimes
significant using only East Asian countries. In contrast, the coefficients are mostly
negative using only Eastern European countries. The regression results are consistent
with the idea that the Eastern European countries have much better credit access. It
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seems that saving decreases when growth is high if the countries have easy access to
credits.
As we mentioned in the introduction, there are those special growth acceleration
episodes. A natural question to ask is whether the Granger causality from growth to
saving is different in those growth acceleration periods. Before we can answer that
question, we first need to empirically define a growth acceleration. This is what we
will do in the next section.
2.3.3 Definition of Growth Acceleration
Intuitively speaking, a growth acceleration episode is a period where growth in-
creases significantly and stays high for a few years. Specifically, it is defined as
follows.9 The growth rate gt,t+n at time t over the horizon t to t+n, where n is equal
to 7 throughout the paper, is defined by the least squares of GDP per capita (y) of
the following:
ln (yi+t) = a+ gt,t+n ∗ t, i = 0, ..., n
9This is how a growth acceleration episode is defined by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005)
[1]. They define how to find a growth acceleration episode empirically in the data.
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The change in the growth rate at time t is therefore simply the change of gt,t+n over
horizon n:
∆gt,n = gt,t+n − gt−n,t (2.1)
The growth accelerations that an economy experiences have to satisfy three condi-
tions:
• gt,t+n ≥ 3.5ppa, growth is rapid.
• ∆gt,n ≥ 2.0 ppa, growth accelerates.
• yt+n ≥ max {yi} , i ≤ t, post-growth output exceeds pre-episode peak.
The timing of the initiation of the growth acceleration is chosen by finding the year
that maximizes the F-stats of a spline regression with a break at the relevant year.
Using this method, there are 51 growth acceleration episodes in the sample. The
reason that the number of episodes is smaller than the number in Hausmann, Pritch-
ett, and Rodrik (2005) [1] is that Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) [1] used a
much larger sample of countries. But in our exercise, we select the sample countries
using Carroll and Weil’s (1994) [9] criteria. We are using Hausmann, Pritchett, and
Rodrik (2005) [1]’s original data on growth acceleration episodes as our benchmark.
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2.3.4 Saving Changes in Growth Acceleration Episodes
In this section, an event-study style of analysis is made in order to provide an
intuitive illustration on how much saving increases after a growth acceleration. This
simple exercise is a complement to the formal empirical test in the next section.
Taking those growth acceleration episodes as given, we compare the pattern of saving
before and after a growth acceleration happens. We first estimate the saving before
growth acceleration by the mean of saving during 7 years before growth acceleration
happens, and call it the pre-GA saving, where GA stands for “growth acceleration”.
Then we calculate the change in saving in the following 9 years against the estimated
pre-GA saving. This saving change is calculated for every growth acceleration episode
and later averaged over all the growth acceleration episodes. An example of the
calculation for a single episode is going to help clarify the above procedure further.
Argentina experienced a growth acceleration in 1990. The pre-GA saving is estimated
by taking the average of the saving from 1983 to 1989. The changes in saving in the
growth acceleration episodes are then calculated by subtracting post-GA saving year
by year by the pre-GA saving average. The calculation is then repeated for all the
identified growth acceleration episodes. Then take the average among all the growth
acceleration episodes. The result is plotted in Figure 2.2.
Saving does increase in all of the post-growth acceleration years that is, all 9 years.
Saving 9 years after the growth acceleration is higher than the pre-GA level by about
2%.
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2.3.5 Granger Causality Test of Saving and Growth
in Growth Acceleration Episodes
Now let us move to the formal empirical test. We want to know whether the
Granger causality from growth to saving is statistically different in growth acceleration
episodes. We add to the literature by looking at the relationship between saving and
growth in growth acceleration periods. Our empirical strategy of testing whether
saving is higher in growth acceleration episodes is to add a growth acceleration dummy
variable and its interactions with lagged saving and lagged growth. Without the
dummy variable and the interaction terms, the empirical specification is identical to
that of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9]. With the dummy terms, we can test whether
the Granger causality is different in the periods where growth accelerates. The basic
empirical strategy is to run the following pair of regressions:
Git = αGi + ηGt + βGDit−1 + γGSit−1 + δGDit−1 · Sit−1 + εit
Sit = αSi + ηSt + βSDit−1 + γSGit−1 + δSDit−1 ·Git−1 + εit
where Dit−1 is a growth acceleration dummy variable that is equal to the ratio that
describes how many years in the 5-year moving average window is within a growth
acceleration episode. For example, if 2 years in a 5-year window are in a growth
acceleration episode, Dit is equal to 2/5; αi is the country fixed effect, which takes
care of the cross-country differences in growth and saving; ηt is a full set of time
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dummies to control for time-varying factors that are common across countries; Sit−1
is lagged saving; and Git−1 is lagged growth. The Granger causality test is to test
whether γ is statistically different from zero. On top of the Granger causality test,
we test whether the Granger causality is significantly different in periods of growth
accelerations. If δ is statistically different from zero, there is a statistically significant
difference between the Granger causality going from the independent variables to the
dependent variable in growth acceleration episodes. To remove the business cycle
influences, all the variables are in the non-overlapping 5-year moving average. When
Dit−1 and the interactions are not included, the empirical specifications are exactly
the same as that of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9].
Adding the growth acceleration dummy Dit and its interactions with lagged saving
and lagged growth, the effect of growth on saving in the growth acceleration periods
can then be evaluated. The baseline regression results using non-overlapping 5-year
average data are presented in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. Table 2.7 reports the same
saving regressions using different versions of the PWT data; Table 2.8 reports the
growth regressions. The coefficients of lagged growth are statistically significant in
all the columns using first-generation PWT; and are not significant in Column 6 and
Column 7 using second-generation PWT. The magnitude of the coefficients estimated
for the lagged growth in the saving regression is also slightly smaller in Column 6 and
Column 7 when they are not significant. Meanwhile, the R-squares are high in all
columns. Without the dummy terms, the results are just what are found in the study
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of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9]. Growth Granger-causes saving, but saving does not
positively Granger-cause growth. The more interesting results are about the dummy
terms. The coefficients on lagged GA dummy Dit−1 are positive and significant using
first-generation PWT except in Column 2. This is consistent with the result in Section
2.3.4, where saving increases within growth acceleration periods. The coefficients of
the interaction of Dit−1 with lagged growth are mostly insignificant or marginally
significant, and as a consequence, the combined effect of growth on saving in a growth
acceleration period is not statistically different. People seems to be able to consume
their additional income from the accelerated economic growth, and the acceleration
effect appears to be secondary. In addition, the changes in R-square by adding Dit−1
and its interactions are tiny. One possible reason that the growth acceleration has a
minimal effect could be the fact that the number of growth acceleration years is small
relative to the number of country years. If the regressions do not include lagged saving
and lagged growth, the growth acceleration dummies will not be significant either.
Putting the above evidence together, it appears to us that the results suggest that the
Granger causality going from growth to saving is not different in growth acceleration
episodes. The Granger causality from growth to saving in normal periods is not
driving by those growth acceleration episodes.
The coefficients of lagged saving in Table 2.8 are either insignificant or significantly
negative. For example, the coefficients are statistically significantly negative in Col-
umn 1, Column 3, Column 4, Column 5, and Column 6 in Table 2.8. The coefficients
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of the growth acceleration dummy Dit are not significant in most of the columns.
The coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically significant in most of the
columns either. The coefficients of the interaction terms are only marginally signif-
icant in Column 1, Column 4, and Column 5. The combined coefficients on lagged
saving are still negative. Saving either does not Granger-cause growth to increase
or Granger-causes growth to decrease. This is not changed in growth acceleration
periods.
2.4 Cases
In the previous sections, we formally test the Granger causality from growth to
saving. Growth Granger-causes saving to rise. Saving does not Granger-cause growth
to increase and even Granger causes growth to decrease in some cases. The empirical
evidence is in support of the view that high growth predicts high saving. In this
section, we will examine this predictability using a few country examples.
2.4.1 Japan
Japan is one good example of both high growth and high saving. After a high-
growth period starting from the 1950s, Japan had seen its saving rate rising rapidly in
the 1960s and 1970s, from about 15% to more than 35%. As a consequence, Hayashi
(1986) [94] wrote the paper “Why Is Japan’s Saving Rate So Apparently High?” It
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is an interesting coincidence that after he published the paper, Japan’s economic
growth slowed down. After the slowing down of the economic growth in Japan in
the 1990s, the saving rate also stopped rising and started to decline. All of these
interesting dynamics of saving and growth can be seen in Figure 2.3, where saving
rate and lagged growth rate are plotted. The red solid line is the lagged 5-year moving
window growth rate (left axis), and the dashed green line is the 5-year moving window
saving rate (right axis).
2.4.2 Korea
Korea also experienced both high economic growth and high saving. Korea
recorded very rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time,
the saving rate steadily increased from less than 10% to 30%.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we test the results of the study of Carroll and Weil (1994) [9]
using more recent PWT data. In addition, we extend the results in the research of
Carroll and Weil (1994) [9] by looking at periods of growth accelerations. Carroll
and Weil’s (1994) [9] results are robust. In growth acceleration episodes, the saving
rate rises. But the Granger causality of growth on saving is not statistically different
in those growth acceleration episodes. The empirical evidence does not support the
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view that the predictability of high growth on high saving is driven by those growth
acceleration episodes. When we look at specific country examples, the high-growth
and high-saving pattern captures well their historical experience. High economic
growth precedes the rise of the saving rate. However, this paper is not an attempt to
provide reasons behind the statistical relationships found in our results. Rather, the
statistical relationship examined in this paper leads us to wonder what economic story
is behind the high-growth and high-saving pattern. Consumption habit formation
may be one good candidate. But this is still an open question that is left for future
research.
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Note: The changes of savings are calculated as the difference relative to its mean level before growth
accelerations happened.
Figure 2.1: Long-term growth and saving
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Table 2.1: Saving Regressions of the Granger Causality Test: 1st Gen PWT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES S S S S S
Lagged 5-years Saving 0.566*** 0.590*** 0.620*** 0.675*** 0.688***
(0.0376) (0.0358) (0.0347) (0.0294) (0.0295)
Lagged 5-years Growth 0.150* 0.240*** 0.188** 0.173** 0.294***
(0.0883) (0.0805) (0.0802) (0.0769) (0.0755)
Constant 8.931*** 7.486*** 7.545*** 9.113*** 7.865***
(1.548) (1.351) (1.513) (2.348) (2.367)
Observations 470 522 571 653 667
R-squared 0.934 0.946 0.932 0.886 0.897
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Growth Regressions of the Granger Causality Test: 1st Gen PWT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES G G G G G
Lagged 5-years Saving -0.0405* -0.0229 -0.0422** -0.0798*** -0.0819***
(0.0236) (0.0213) (0.0191) (0.0166) (0.0171)
Lagged 5-years Growth -0.0617 -0.0275 0.00139 0.0615 0.0520
(0.0520) (0.0504) (0.0445) (0.0446) (0.0440)
Constant 6.182*** 5.610*** 5.709*** 9.280*** 9.512***
(0.899) (0.805) (0.814) (1.295) (1.326)
Observations 447 498 550 628 647
R-squared 0.629 0.657 0.652 0.598 0.584
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: CW Granger Causality Test: 2nd Gen PWT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES S G S G S G
5-years pre-episode initial income 0.518 0.327
(0.436) (0.247)
Lagged 5-years Saving 0.691*** -0.0360** 0.688*** -0.0239 0.681*** -0.0282
(0.0306) (0.0173) (0.0307) (0.0171) (0.0313) (0.0174)
Lagged 5-years Growth 0.0293 -0.0444 0.0679 -0.0696 0.0517 -0.0791*
(0.0770) (0.0458) (0.0779) (0.0458) (0.0791) (0.0463)
Constant 6.264*** 4.804*** 6.456*** 4.605*** 2.558 2.138
(2.379) (1.343) (2.332) (1.297) (4.026) (2.273)
Observations 654 633 657 637 657 637
R-squared 0.871 0.348 0.877 0.350 0.878 0.352
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Saving Regressions of the Granger Causality Test: 2nd Gen PWT Dif-
ferent Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES S S S S S S
Lagged 5-years Saving 0.691*** 0.686*** 0.691*** 0.688*** 0.686*** 0.691***
(0.0307) (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0306)
Lagged 5-years Growth 0.0339 0.0760 0.0293 0.0679 0.308*** 0.316***
(0.0776) (0.0791) (0.0770) (0.0779) (0.102) (0.0996)
Constant 6.251*** 6.461*** 6.264*** 6.456*** 4.827** 4.985**
(2.378) (2.333) (2.379) (2.332) (2.390) (2.335)
Observations 654 656 654 657 645 648
R-squared 0.871 0.878 0.871 0.877 0.874 0.882
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.1
Price Con Con Cur Cur NA NA
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Saving Regressions of Granger Causality Test: East Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES S S S S S S S
Lagged 5-years Saving 0.670*** 0.768*** 0.788*** 0.572*** 0.670*** 0.620*** 0.456
(0.110) (0.103) (0.0961) (0.112) (0.103) (0.150) (0.513)
Lagged 5-years Growth 0.600** 0.158 0.0422 0.489** 0.257 0.394* 0.441
(0.266) (0.231) (0.213) (0.239) (0.216) (0.218) (0.477)
Constant 0.396 3.616 2.415 7.288* 6.937* 5.005* 11.84
(2.016) (2.857) (2.475) (3.626) (3.525) (2.951) (8.318)
Observations 37 47 48 54 54 54 26
R-squared 0.939 0.923 0.917 0.848 0.857 0.847 0.863
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1 8.0 8.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Saving Regressions of Granger Causality Test: Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES S S S S S S S
Lagged 5-years Saving 1.376* 0.328 0.677** 0.767*** 0.758*** 0.534** 0.455**
(0.470) (0.278) (0.243) (0.167) (0.176) (0.211) (0.208)
Lagged 5-years Growth -0.406 1.534* 0.864 -0.130 -0.212 -0.290 -0.185
(0.839) (0.632) (0.668) (0.406) (0.390) (0.226) (0.275)
Constant 5.247 2.822 -0.876 14.44* 16.01* 15.28*** 15.99***
(10.31) (8.474) (11.52) (8.252) (8.189) (5.196) (5.189)
Observations 14 20 27 36 36 36 34
R-squared 0.959 0.944 0.931 0.918 0.919 0.889 0.795
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1 8.0 8.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Saving Regressions of the Granger Causality Test: Growth Acceleration
Episodes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES S S S S S S S
Lagged GA dummy 3.461** 2.039 2.806* 3.681*** 3.476** 0.197 -0.00674
(1.609) (1.357) (1.478) (1.419) (1.434) (1.040) (1.044)
Lagged 5-years Saving 0.564*** 0.591*** 0.620*** 0.674*** 0.688*** 0.691*** 0.688***
(0.0375) (0.0358) (0.0346) (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0307) (0.0308)
Lagged 5-years Growth 0.174* 0.232*** 0.188** 0.159* 0.331*** 0.0149 0.0698
(0.0986) (0.0878) (0.0870) (0.0848) (0.0826) (0.0875) (0.0890)
Interact with g -0.336* -0.166 -0.236 -0.272* -0.361** 0.0365 -0.00609
(0.198) (0.168) (0.178) (0.164) (0.167) (0.192) (0.194)
Constant 8.403*** 7.030*** 6.922*** 9.086*** 7.485*** 6.343*** 6.447***
(1.562) (1.387) (1.541) (2.345) (2.374) (2.391) (2.343)
Observations 470 522 571 653 667 654 657
R-squared 0.935 0.947 0.933 0.888 0.898 0.871 0.877
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1 8.0 8.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: Growth Regressions of the Granger Causality Test: Growth Acceleration
Episodes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES G G G G G G G
Lagged GA dummy -0.120 0.697 0.541 -0.791 -0.609 1.626** 1.437*
(0.703) (0.560) (0.617) (0.816) (0.747) (0.809) (0.791)
Lagged 5-years Saving -0.0592** -0.0216 -0.0425** -0.0857*** -0.0906*** -0.0356** -0.0242
(0.0248) (0.0217) (0.0196) (0.0169) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0173)
Lagged 5-years Growth -0.0882 -0.0546 -0.0206 0.0365 0.0341 -0.0659 -0.0914*
(0.0539) (0.0523) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0453) (0.0465) (0.0466)
Interact with s 0.0572* -0.00343 0.00304 0.0658* 0.0547* -0.0293 -0.0200
(0.0346) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0340) (0.0310) (0.0380) (0.0372)
Constant 6.361*** 5.443*** 5.564*** 9.606*** 9.873*** 4.924*** 4.736***
(0.901) (0.811) (0.820) (1.296) (1.331) (1.340) (1.295)
Observations 447 498 550 628 647 633 637
R-squared 0.637 0.660 0.655 0.603 0.588 0.357 0.359
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PWT 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.1 8.0 8.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Economic Regimes and Regional




Using Chinese data, this paper investigates how the pattern of capital flows at
the provincial level evolves with the transition of economic regimes. According to
the standard neoclassical growth theory, fast-growing economies should borrow ag-
gressively to finance their consumption and investment, resulting in current account
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deficits. However, cross-country studies, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2] in par-
ticular, suggest the “allocation puzzle” of capital: capital flows out of developing
countries with high productivity growth.1 We take a regional perspective to explore
the nexus between economic regimes and capital flows. Our model-based regression
analysis reveals an intriguing picture of the evolving pattern of capital flows across
Chinese provinces. The “allocation puzzle” became much less pronounced after the
large-scale economic reform since 1978, while continued reform had little impact on
further reversing the direction of capital flows.
This paper, to our knowledge, is the first paper that explores the dynamics of
the “allocation puzzle” through the lens of regime change. This paper is closely
related to a growing body of work that investigates the “allocation puzzle” using
regional data. One advantage of taking a regional perspective is that cross-border
frictions are less of concerns (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008 [31], and
Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel, 2013 [30]). Based on a parsimonious dynamic general
equilibrium model, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) [33] find that inter-state capital
flows in US are consistent with the theoretical prediction. In contrast, using Chinese
provincial data, Cudré (2014) [95] and Cudré and Hoffmann (2014) [96] document the
“allocation puzzle” in the post-reform era and examine the underlying mechanism
via the structural framework of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2]. They provide
1Various explanations have been proposed to rationalize the “allocation puzzle” of capital (among
many others, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2014, [29], Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas,
2008 [11], Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin, 2015 [34], Jin, 2012 [38], and von Hagen and Zhang,
2014 [10]).
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compelling evidence that domestic frictions could also give rise to the “allocation
puzzle” of capital. Our work complements the existing regional studies by opening
up the dimension of economic regimes, thus shedding further light on the importance
of institutional factors in explaining the “allocation puzzle”.
This paper is also related to the strand of literature that studies (in)efficiency of
China’s domestic capital allocation. As a seminal work, Boyreau-Debray and Wei
(2005) [97] point out various pathological issues of the state-dominated financial sys-
tem and argue that government intervention tends to reinforce capital flows in the
“wrong” direction. Using data from 1984 to 2001, they find that capital tends to
flow into less productive provinces. Li (2010) [98] further confirms that capital allo-
cation is not efficient in China, which is suggested by the positive correlation between
saving and investment at the provincial level. Armed with more sophisticated econo-
metric tools, Chan et al. (2011) [99], Lai, McNelis, and Yan (2013) [100], and Chan,
Lai, and Yan (2013) [101] provide systematic evidence that capital mobility, private
capital mobility in particular, has been improved over the course of economic reform.
Guided by the framework of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) [79], Chan et al. (2011) [99]
document a significant improvement in capital mobility from 1978 to 2006. They
separately estimate the relationship between saving and investment for two episodes,
1978-1992 and 1993-2006, and find that the change of the economic regime in 1992
has pronounced impact on the integration of regional capital market. In addition,
their paper also documents the intriguing dynamics of regional capital mobility by
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employing rolling panel dynamic OLS estimation. In contrast, Lai, McNelis, and Yan
(2013) [100] argue that a panel time varying coefficient model is more suitable for
understanding the evolution of the regional capital mobility due to the gradualist na-
ture of Chinese economic reform. Using this new approach, they find less significant
improvement of the regional capital mobility over the sample period. Brandt, Tombe,
and Zhu (2013) [102] measure productivity losses due to capital and labor misalloca-
tion. They find that misallocation between private firms and state-owned enterprises
becomes more prominent since mid-1990s. By estimating a structural model, Song
and Wu (2014) [103] confirm that capital misallocation results in substantial revenue
losses for Chinese firms. Most of the existing work focuses on post-reform era, but
our paper explores the pattern of capital flows back to pre-reform era by employing
a model-based but parsimonious framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the
history of the Chinese economic reforms. This section describes how China’s economic
transition can be divided into three distinctive phases. Section 3.3 discusses empirical
specification and sample construction. Section 3.4 presents the regression results and
the discussion of the results. In Section 3.5, we conclude the paper.
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3.2 China’s Economic Reform: Three Regimes
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, China has gone through
waves of huge changes of its economic institutions.2 There are three distinctive
regimes: the central planning (1952-1978), the incremental reform (1978-1992) and
the overall advance reform (1992-2007). After the victory in 1949, China first built
a central planning economy of the Soviet style in the hope of catching up or even
surpassing the Great Britain and the United States in a very short period of time.
However, the good hope only turned into huge economic and political turmoil. The
Great Leap Forward, which aimed to boost productivity growth, did not lead to rapid
economic growth but to the Great Famine instead, which cost millions of lives (Yang
and Li, 2005 [105]). The Cultural Revolution shifted the attention of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) from economic development to political fights. The economic
development and people’s standards of living were stagnated.
After years of political chaos, the Communist Party of China (CPC) finally decided
to shift its focus to economic development. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CCCPC) in December 1978 was
the turning point for China’s economic development. A new approach to reform
was found, the strategy of incremental reform (1978-1992). The new growth comes
mainly from the nonstate sectors.3 The bottom-up reform started to grow itself
2See Wu (2005) [104] for an excellent and comprehensive description of the China’s economic
reform.
3In some sense, what the meeting did was to plant the seed and the economic prosperity grew by
itself. The economic success was largely driven by the growth of the nonstate sector.
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from the rural sector in Anhui province.4 Decollectivization and the introduction of
the household-responsibility system greatly contributed to the improved total factor
productivity and output growth (Lin, 1992 [106]). The government also lifted control
and allowed peasants to sell their grain at the market after they fulfilled the required
quotas. Later on the township-village enterprises (TVEs) started to take off. The
number of peasants working in industrial and commercial township-village enterprises
(TVEs) reached 100 millions between 1979 and 1988. The new entries and rapid
growth of those township-village enterprises (TVEs) have been the main engine of
China’s growth until early 1990s (Qian, 2002 [107]). In a system where allocating
resources by plan had not yet been changed, special institutional arrangement is
needed for the nonstate sectors to survive. The dual-track system was introduced to
solve the problem of the channels of supply and the pricing of products for nonstate
sectors. Economists hold different views on the dual-track system. Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992) [108] think that the dual-track system will create misallocation.
Controls of prices should be lifted all at once. Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997) [109]
think that the dual-track price liberalization is Pareto-improving. There are also
political economy reasons why dual-track system may be desirable because it makes
the reform more acceptable for those nested interest groups. Lau, Qian, and Roland
4The local officials in Xiaogang village in Anhui province secretly tried out the system of contract-
ing land, other resources, and output quotas to individual households because otherwise starvation
was a real threat due to the low yields. Private contracting land to individual households at that
time was considered to be opposed to socialist principles and could be subject to severe penalty. But
this new contracting practice significantly increased the yields. Later, local and central authorities
conceded this new form of production. This decollectivization spread like grass, growing from 1%
in 1979 to 14% in 1980. Full official acceptance was not given until late 1981 (Lin, 1992 [106]).
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(2000) [110] argue that the dual-track system created a reform without losers. The
nonpublic sectors share of industrial output grew from 0% in 1978 to almost 10%
in 1990. The share of retail sales grew even faster, from 2.1% in 1978 to 28.7% in
1990. Another important part of the reform is to open China to the rest of the world.
Opening up the coastal port cities turned out to be an ingenious policy to make
advantages of backwardness and introduce market and competition in China. Four
special economic zones were set up in 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen.
International trade prospered first. China’s openness measured by the ratio of exports
and imports to GNP increased from 9.9% in 1978 to 31.9% in 1990. Then, Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) started to flood in, totaled to US 18.6 billion between 1986
and 1991. Participation in the import and export market also accelerated the price
reform. Overall, the incremental reform proved to be hugely successful. The GDP
grew by 14.6 percent annually between 1978 and 1990.
But the drawbacks of the incremental reform are also obvious. Rent-seeking activ-
ities and corruption are rampant. There are intense conflicts between the state sectors
and the nonstate sectors in the economic system, and the system could only run at
enormous cost without the overall reforms. Thus, China moved to a reform strategy
of overall advance (1992-2007), and the reform was deepened and accelerated. The
southern tour of Deng Xiaoping marked the starting of this new round of reform.
During the tour, he made the famous South China speeches to promote reform and
opening up. Later on, the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
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(CPC) formally set the reform target of establishing a socialist market economy in
October, 1992. A new reform strategy of overall advance with key breakthroughs was
explicitly put forward. The Soviet viewpoint that “the higher the proportion of the
state sector in the national economy, the better” was discarded at the 15th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1997. In 1998, the decision of
the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was incorpo-
rated into the Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China
“In the primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic economic system of
keeping public ownership as the mainstay of the economy and allowing diverse forms
of ownership to develop side by side.”5 After the overall advance reform, the state
sector no longer monopolized the whole economy. The GDP share of the state sector
decreased to 38% by 2001.
3.3 Empirical Specification and Data
Based on a standard neoclassical growth model, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2]
demonstrate that capital inflows of a country depend on productivity catchup, initial
capital abundance, population growth, and initial external debt. Their model-based
5Hsieh and Song (2015) [111] is a recent effort in evaluating this “Grasp the large, let go of the
small” way of reforming the state sector.
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empirical specification is of the form
4Di
Y 0i







where 4Di/Y 0i is capital inflows normalized by initial output, πi is productivity




i is normalized initial capital abundance,
D0i /Y
0
i is normalized initial debt level, and εi is an error term. Parameter β1 governs
the relationship between capital flows and productivity growth. A negative estimate
of β1 implies the “allocation puzzle”: fast growing economies see less capital inflows,
opposite to the theoretical prediction.
One great advantage of using China’s regional data is that the regional capital
flows can be directed estimated. With US regional data, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010)
[33] has to use indirect methods to infer about capital flows.6 Our sample is an
unbalanced panel of 29 provinces from 1963 to 2007.7 Chongqing and Tibet are
dropped because of data availability. 2007 seems to be a natural break point as the
financial turmoil started in 2008. The sample period is divided into three economic
regimes (Wang and Yang, 2015 [112]): (1) 1963 - 1977 central-planning regime; (2)
1978 - 1992 transition regime; (3) 1993 - 2007 market regime. Two watersheds are
6China reports expenditure GDP broken down into consumption, investment, government pur-
chase and net export at the provincial level. This makes it possible to calculate the current account
at the provincial level in China, which can not be done using US regional data.
7These provinces are: Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan,
Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Xinjiang, Yunnan, and
Zhejiang.
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“Reform and Opening up” in 1978 and Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992.8 Our
key departure from the existing empirical work is to open up the regime dimension.
We achieve this by introducing two interaction terms into the baseline setting in
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2]
4Di,r
Y 0i,r







where RTransitioni,r = 1 if it is under the transition regime and R
Transition
i,r = 0 otherwise;
RMarketi,r = 1 if it is under the market regime and R
Market
i,r = 0 otherwise; subscript r
stands for one of the three regimes. If γ1 or γ2 substantially differs from zero, we say
regime change plays a role in shaping the regional capital flows.
Our provincial data is obtained from China Compendium of Statistics: 1949 - 2008
published by National Bureau of Statistics. The construction of provincial total fac-
tor productivity (TFP henceforth) closely follows Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2].
Provincial output (Yt) is measured by gross regional product. Using annual fixed cap-
ital formation data, we construct capital stock (Kt) series by the perpetual inventory
method with an annual depreciation rate of 6%. Labor supply (Lt) is measured by
provincial total employment. We set capital share α to be 0.3. Therefore, provincial




t ). Using Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing
8Our results are not sensitive to the specific timing of these three regimes.
9As a cross-check, we compare our provincial TFP estimates with that in Wu (2009) [113] and
they are highly correlated.
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parameter = 6.25)10, we obtain the trend component of provincial TFP (At), and
the productivity catchup (π) is given by AT/(A0 · g), where g is the country-average
TFP growth. Following Cudré (2014) [95], regional capital inflows are measured by
the cumulative difference between provincial investment and saving over each regime.
Initial debt is obtained as cumulative regional capital inflows.11 We also create ad-
ditional variables for robustness check. As a standard practice (Reinhardt, Ricci,
and Tressel, 2013 [30]), financial development is obtained as the total deposits and
loans. Provincial financial friction is proxied by the difference between deposits and
loans. As most of the loans are channeled towards State-Owned Enterprises (SOE),
the amount of remaining funds in the banking system can be viewed as a proxy of
financial friction. Government expenditure is measured by the provincial general
budgetary expenditure. All the variables in level terms (capital inflows, initial capital
abundance, initial debt, financial development & friction, government expenditure)
are normalized by regional gross output. Throughout our data construction, we use
province-specific gross regional product implicit deflator.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for three economic regimes. Productivity
catchup is adjusted by the country-average, so its mean is always zero.
10Suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) [114], the appropriate value of the smoothing parameter is
6.25 for annual data when isolating fluctuations at the traditional business cycle frequencies.
11As is pointed out by Cudré (2014) [95], estimates of initial debt may not be quite reliable, so
we re-estimate our model by excluding initial debt as a covariate and find our results are largely
unchanged.
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3.4 Results
Table 3.2 reports the results of our regression analysis. Column (1) is our base-
line setting. The coefficient of productivity catchup, β1, captures the effect of pro-
ductivity catchup on capital inflows in the central-planning regime. The negative
coefficient suggests that fast-growing provinces experienced less capital inflows in
the pre-reform era. The estimate is statistically significant and economically sizable.
A one-percentage-point increase of productivity catchup yields about 15-percentage-
point decrease of normalized capital inflows. Positive coefficients of two interaction
terms (γ1 and γ2) imply that the “allocation puzzle” became much less evident since
1978. The effect of productivity catchup on capital inflows during transition regime
(β1 + γ1) and market regime (β1 + γ2) is also reported in the table and close to zero.
Interestingly, by comparing γ1 with γ2
12, we find deepened economic reform since
1992 had limited effects on further adjusting the direction of capital flows. Through-
out our sample period, capital inflows are estimated to be negatively correlated, or at
best uncorrelated, with productivity catchup. This result echoes earlier findings by
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2] using cross-country data and Cudré and Hoffmann
(2014) [96] using post-reform Chinese data. The regression also includes the theo-
retically motivated set of regressors as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) [2]: initial
capital abundance, initial debt, and population growth. The coefficient of popula-
tion growth is insignificant. Capital inflows increase with initial capital abundance
12The difference between these two estimates is statistically insignificant.
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and initial debt. Column (2) through Column (6) summarize a battery of robustness
checks. In light of Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) [35], we control for differ-
ential access to external financing between private firms and state-owned enterprises
by including provincial growth rate of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) employment.
Column (2) reports the regression when this control is included. The coefficient of the
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) employment growth is negative but not significant.
According to Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) [97], capital allocation is heavily influ-
enced by the government intervention, so we add provincial government expenditure
into our regressions as well. The coefficient estimate is highly significant suggesting
that government intervention is important. The results are in Column (3). Financial
indicators are also included to capture heterogeneity of regional financial institutions.
Column (4) and Column (5) show the regression results when measures of financial
friction and financial development are controlled. In Column (6), we put all the
controls in the regression together, and our main results still hold. To summarize
the discussions above, under a wide range of additional controls, main results are
largely unchanged. The coefficient of productivity catchup, β1, and the coefficients
of two interaction terms (γ1 and γ2) are highly significant across different specifi-
cations. The significance barely changes when different control variables are added
either separately or jointly.
Our three-regime analysis reveals an interesting dynamic picture of regional cap-
ital flows. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, the large-scale market reform
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substantially alleviated the “allocation puzzle” at its outset. The coefficients of two
interaction terms (γ1 and γ2) are highly significant and positive in all specifications.
As a result, the coefficient of productivity catchup becomes much less negative after
the reform compared with the central-planning period. There are two possible chan-
nels through which the market reform had a large impact on capital flows. First, the
price reform, which was a major component of the market reform, rendered price sig-
nals more informative. Compared with the price system under the central-planning
economy, creation of a dual-track price system allowed prices to be determined by
supply and demand at the margin (Wu and Zhao, 1987 [115]). Gradual lifting of
price controls reduced distortion, thus adjusting the capital flows more consistent to
the prediction of a standard growth model. Second, pre-reform regional capital flows
were exclusively determined by the central planning system. As collective and private
enterprises were permitted to operate on a market base, decentralization of invest-
ment decisions allowed capital flows not to solely follow the preference of the central
planner. Market forces started to have influence on the pattern of capital flows.
However, deepened market reform, marked by Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 speech in par-
ticular, did not yield appreciable effect on further adjusting the direction of capital
flows. A complete explanation of the evolving “allocation puzzle” is out of the scope
of this paper, but we provide a tentative explanation in line with Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti (2011) [35]. According to their theory, the negative correlation between
productivity growth and capital inflows is driven by a specific channel of financial
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friction: State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) usually have preferential access to credit,
while private firms have to rely on their own entrepreneurial saving to invest (Chong,
Lu, and Ongena, 2013 [116]). For a province that hosts many private firms, it tends
to achieve higher productivity growth accompanied by less capital inflows, because
fast-growing private firms have limited access to external financing and thereby sav-
ing outgrows investment. In contrast, a province that is dominated by State-Owned
Enterprises (SOE) tends to enjoy capital inflows because State-Owned Enterprises
(SOE) are preferentially treated in the credit market. In their cross-province regres-
sions, Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) [35] document a positive correlation
between provincial net surplus (capital outflows) and the employment growth of pri-
vate firms. By adding State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) employment growth into our
baseline model, we also find a negative estimated coefficient, but this coefficient is
statistically insignificant and not robust under inclusion of a full range of controls.
This suggests a complete understanding of the persistent “allocation puzzle” in the
post-reform era, albeit to a lesser degree, calls for future research.13
Table 3.3 repeats our main regression analysis of Table 3.2 but uses the inter-
provincial capital inflows as the dependent variable. When constructing our measure
of inter-provincial capital inflows, we subtract the provincial net export from the
difference between provincial investment and saving over each regime. The other pro-
cedures are the same as described in Section 3.3. Column (1) reports the baseline
13Other than composition of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) and private firms, Cudré and Hoff-
mann (2014) [96] demonstrate that a province’s integration into the global market and its sectoral
composition also play a significant role in shaping the pattern of capital flows.
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setting without additional controls. There are a number of differences between the
results in Table 3.3 and Table 3.2. The coefficient of productivity catchup, β1, is
less significant and sometimes not significant in Table 3.3. The effect of productivity
catchup on capital inflows during transition regime (β1 + γ1) is positive. The differ-
ent results suggest that the pattern of the inter-provincial capital flows is closer to
what the neoclassical theory predicts and that the international frictions also play a
role in shaping the direction of the capital flows. Positive coefficients of two inter-
action terms γ1 and γ2 imply that the “allocation puzzle” became less evident since
1978. The interaction term γ1 is marginally significant suggesting that the onset
of the reform has an impact on the pattern of inter-provincial capital flows; how-
ever, the other interaction term γ2 never is significant. This lends further support to
our previous results that deepened reform seems to have limited effect on adjusting
the direction of the capital flows further. The improvement is concentrated in the
transition from central planning economy toward the market system. All regressions
include the theoretically motivated set of regressors: initial capital abundance, ini-
tial debt, and population growth. Inter-provincial capital inflows decrease with the
population growth as the coefficient of population growth is negative and highly sig-
nificant. Compared with Table 3.2, the coefficients of initial capital abundance are
much less significant. In Column (2) through Column (5), additional controls such
as provincial growth rate of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) employment, provincial
government expenditure and two financial indicators are included separately; Column
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(6) includes all the additional control variables. Adding additional control variables
does not alter the baseline results. In Column (2), the coefficient of the State-Owned
Enterprises (SOE) employment is positive and significant. This is consistent with
that State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) received preferentially treatment in the credit
market. This is also consistent with the story in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti
(2011) [35] that the growth of private firms is associated with capital outflows. Simi-
lar to the results in Table 3.2, the coefficient of the provincial government expenditure
is significant and positive in Column (4). In addition, the magnitude of the coeffi-
cient does not change much. The coefficients of two financial indicators are highly
significant. The development and the friction of the financial system are important
factors affecting the capital flows.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the dynamic pattern of capital flows under different eco-
nomic regimes. China’s three-regime economic reform provides a natural experiment
and the possibility to investigate this problem. China’s provincial data makes it
possible to analyze the “allocation puzzle” from a regional perspective. Though the
“allocation puzzle” is estimated to become substantially less pronounced after the
initial reform, continued and deepened economic reform seems to have limited effects
on reversing the “wrong” direction of capital flows. This finding sheds further light
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on the nexus between capital flows and institutional factors of the economy. It is also
an interesting direction for future research.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Central-planning Regime: 1963-1977
Productivity catchup 24 0.000 0.213 -0.292 0.556
Population growth 29 0.402 0.160 0.012 0.701
Capital inflows 28 -1.246 6.190 -18.347 11.902
Initial capital abundance 25 2.205 1.250 0.280 6.843
Initial debt 25 -0.236 2.108 -5.017 5.005
SOE employment growth 26 0.394 0.270 -0.064 0.951
Financial development 27 0.939 0.317 0.604 2.220
Financial friction 27 -0.115 0.329 -0.559 1.291
Government expenditure 27 0.183 0.146 0.075 0.859
Transition Regime: 1978-1992
Productivity catchup 28 0.000 0.185 -0.304 0.496
Population growth 29 0.229 0.054 0.130 0.356
Capital inflows 28 0.438 3.929 -7.144 11.023
Initial capital abundance 28 1.889 0.849 0.289 3.923
Initial debt 28 -0.381 2.344 -6.092 5.065
SOE employment growth 28 -0.028 0.105 -0.247 0.179
Financial development 29 1.306 0.315 0.949 2.508
Financial friction 29 -0.138 0.216 -0.500 0.720
Government expenditure 29 0.153 0.061 0.079 0.310
Market Regime: 1993-2008
Productivity catchup 29 0.000 0.138 -0.188 0.400
Population growth 29 0.137 0.099 0.011 0.469
Capital inflows 29 0.707 4.165 -8.513 10.292
Initial capital abundance 29 1.983 0.593 0.400 3.503
Initial debt 29 0.081 1.612 -3.949 4.384
SOE employment growth 28 -0.521 0.097 -0.746 -0.311
Financial development 29 2.197 0.640 1.398 4.606
Financial friction 29 0.183 0.273 -0.202 1.356
Government expenditure 29 0.133 0.046 0.071 0.261
Source: China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008
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Table 3.2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity catchup (β1) -15.05*** -14.07*** -10.50*** -15.08*** -14.11*** -7.768*
(3.674) (4.258) (3.676) (3.781) (3.653) (4.349)
Productivity catchup 12.71** 11.89** 10.12** 12.71** 12.00** 8.955*
×RTransition (γ1) (5.029) (5.567) (4.767) (5.120) (4.960) (5.170)
Productivity catchup 13.95*** 13.09** 10.98** 14.03** 14.33*** 10.92**
×RMarket (γ2) (5.246) (5.650) (4.958) (5.382) (5.170) (5.208)
Population growth -1.006 -0.00513 -3.277 -0.915 1.640 0.343
(2.554) (4.015) (2.500) (2.601) (2.800) (3.927)
Initial capital abundance 2.241*** 2.329*** 1.312** 2.210*** 1.926*** 0.378
(0.560) (0.637) (0.589) (0.571) (0.571) (0.671)
Initial debt 1.393*** 1.368*** 1.106*** 1.401*** 1.427*** 1.250***
(0.211) (0.220) (0.211) (0.214) (0.208) (0.219)
SOE employment growth -0.358 1.602
(1.334) (1.783)
Government expenditure 31.92*** 31.42***
(8.744) (9.354)
Financial friction -0.118 -4.456***
(1.099) (1.568)
Financial development 1.104** 3.369***
(0.529) (0.935)
Constant -4.005*** -4.454*** -6.374*** -3.949*** -5.677*** -10.39***
(1.138) (1.404) (1.240) (1.159) (1.394) (1.674)
β1 + γ1 -2.344 -2.184 -0.380 -2.363 -2.109 1.187
(3.144) (3.271) (2.974) (3.186) (3.094) (2.872)
β1 + γ2 -1.096 -0.977 0.476 -1.050 0.220 3.153
(4.213) (4.365) (3.951) (4.270) (4.187) (3.810)
Observations 81 78 80 80 80 76
R-squared 0.674 0.668 0.725 0.675 0.694 0.775
Dependent variable = capital inflows. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Inter-provincial Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity catch-up (β1) -14.66** -17.33** -10.43 -10.18* -17.82*** 0.514
(6.581) (7.461) (6.999) (6.000) (6.191) (7.873)
Productivity catch-up 17.10* 20.07** 14.82 13.44 19.45** 4.432
×RTransition (γ1) (9.008) (9.755) (9.077) (8.125) (8.406) (9.358)
Productivity catch-up 12.37 13.09 9.582 6.827 11.84 -2.614
×RTransition (γ2) (9.395) (9.901) (9.439) (8.541) (8.762) (9.427)
Population growth -9.899** -19.04*** -12.33** -10.85** -17.39*** -5.396
(4.575) (7.036) (4.760) (4.128) (4.746) (7.109)
Initial capital abundance 1.309 1.987* 0.447 1.207 2.138** 0.660
(1.003) (1.117) (1.122) (0.906) (0.968) (1.215)
Initial debt 1.414*** 1.461*** 1.132*** 1.453*** 1.340*** 0.863**
(0.378) (0.386) (0.402) (0.340) (0.353) (0.397)






Financial development -3.288*** -2.783
(0.896) (1.692)
Constant 0.391 1.659 -1.937 0.756 5.558** -1.413
(2.038) (2.460) (2.362) (1.839) (2.363) (3.031)
β1 + γ1 2.443 2.734 4.387 3.260 1.626 4.946
(5.631) (5.732) (5.663) (5.055) (5.244) (5.198)
β1 + γ2 -2.288 -4.241 -0.850 -3.351 -5.977 -2.100
(7.546) (7.650) (7.523) (6.777) (7.097) (6.897)
Observations 81 78 80 80 80 76
R-squared 0.305 0.338 0.338 0.456 0.415 0.522
Dependent variable = inter-provincial capital inflows. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Growth Acceleration Episodes (Haus-
mann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005 [1])
Table A.1 reports the episodes if only developing countries are considered.
Table A.2 reports all the episodes if developed countries are also included.
A.2 Balassa-Samuelson Model
The tradable goods sector and nontradable goods sector both use capital and
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Two assumptions are important to the Balassa-Samuelson model. First, capital
and labor are perfectly mobile and earn their marginal products at all times; second,
tradable goods price does not change.
Marginal product of capital is equal to the interest rate minus depreciation
MPK = R− k
where R = 1 + r is the interest rate factor; k = 1− δ, and δ is the depreciation rate.
Marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate, and the wage rate is equal
in two sectors as labor is perfectly mobile. If the wage rate in the tradable goods
sector is higher, workers will flood into the tradable goods sector driving down the
wage rate until the wage rate is equal in two sectors.
MPL = W
The two marginal product conditions give us the following 4 equations
αTk
αT−1
T AT = pαNk
αN−1
N AN = R− k
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(1− αT )ATkαTT = W







. 4 equations and 4 unknowns kT , kN , p,W make sure that
the relative price p can be solved.
Solving the above system of equations, the relative price is a function of the












The Balassa-Samuelson model predicts that when tradable goods productivity
increase, the real exchange rate will appreciate according to the above equation.1
If the nontradable goods productivity does not change ANt+1
ANt
= 1, and the tradable
goods sector is more capital intensive which implies 1−αN
1−αT
> 1, then the changes in the
relative price are equal to, at least, the changes in the tradable goods productivity.
1In a different model, it is possible that when TFP increases in the tradable goods sector, the
real exchange rate depreciates (Benigno and Thoenissen, 2003 [117]).
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A.3 Real Exchange Rate Definition
To formally define real exchange rate in the model world, now consider another
open economy, and call it the foreign country.2 Denote the variables in the foreign
country with an asterisk. Assume the same structure for this foreign country, and
the only difference is the relative price p∗. Therefore, by an identical calculation, we
have P ∗C .
P ∗C = p
∗1−θ
The definition of the real exchange rate is standard and straightforward. The real
exchange rate is defined as the relative price of the aggregate consumption index in







Therefore, other things being equal, if p increases, RER decreases i.e. The real
exchange rate appreciates. The changes of relative price p are isomorphic to the real
exchange rate. Further, without loss of generality, if the relative price p∗ in the foreign




2In later analysis, the foreign country is not analyzed. The only purpose of mentioning the foreign
country is to define the real exchange rate explicitly. This is a small open economy model.
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A.4 Derive FOCs from the Lagrangian
Differentiate the Lagrangian (1.13) with respect to CTt, CNt, pt, LTt, Bt+1, Ht+1, KTt+1,









































= λtYNt − λtCNt = 0
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∂L
∂Kt+1









Tt+1 + 1− δ + ξ (Kt+2 −Kt+1)
]}
Rearranging terms gives the first order equations in the main text.










θ (1− αT )ATkα − η (1− θ) rB̄
η (1− θ) (ATkα − δk) + θ (1− αT )ATkα
K = kLT
CT = ATK
αL1−αT − δKT + rB̄





αL1−αT − δKT + rB̄
)
θAN (1− LT )η
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A.6 Numerical Resolutions
In every iteration, we start from the current guess of the policy functions LTt, It, µt
given last period state variables. With the three policy functions, the other period
t variables can be easily calculated. CTt is calculated from equation (A.1); YTt from
equation (1.3); YNt from equation (1.4); λt from equation (1.14).
CTt =
(1− αT ) θATtKαt L−αTt (1− LTt)
(1− θ) η
(A.1)
Using the law of motions equation (1.8), equation (1.2) and equation (1.7), the
calculations of the period t state variables are straightforward given last period state
variables and the policy functions. Next period AT depends on the next period
regimes which evolves according to the Markov process. With the period t state
variables at hand, period t + 1 policy functions LTt, It, µt are obtained by linear
interpolation for both regimes. For each regime, we calculate all the other period
t + 1 variables and other period t + 1 state variables Bt, Ht and Kt in a similar
way for both regimes. With the other period t + 1 variables and the interpolated
policy functions at hand, we can evaluate whether the equilibrium conditions with
expectation are satisfied or not. Expectations of equation (1.17), equation (1.18)
and equation (1.19) are calculated using the probability in the Markov transition
matrix. Then Chris Sims’s root finder is used to solve for the zeros of the expectation
equations. The output from the root finder are the updated policy functions values
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for the next iteration. The program iterates until the distance between the guess
and the updated policy functions values is less than the convergence criterion on all
nodes.
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Note: The changes of each variables are calculated as the difference relative to its mean level before growth
accelerations happened
Source: PWT 7.1
Figure A.1: All countries
Country Year Country Year
Chile 1986 Mauritius 1983
China 1978 Malaysia 1988
China 1990 Pakistan 1979
Congo, Republic of 1978 Thailand 1986
Dominican Republic 1992 Uganda 1977
India 1982 Uganda 1989
Sri Lanka 1979 Uruguay 1974
Table A.1: Growth Acceleration Episodes
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Country Year Country Year
Argentina 1990 Mauritius 1983
Chile 1986 Malaysia 1988
China 1978 Norway 1991
China 1990 Pakistan 1979
Congo, Republic of 1978 Poland 1992
Dominican Republic 1992 Portugal 1985
Spain 1984 Romania 1979
Finland 1992 Thailand 1986
United Kingdom 1982 Trinidad & Tobago 1975
India 1982 Uganda 1977
Ireland 1985 Uganda 1989
Korea, Republic of 1984 Uruguay 1974
Sri Lanka 1979 Uruguay 1989
Table A.2: Growth Acceleration Episodes: Adding Developed Countries
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[96] S. Cudré and M. Hoffmann, “A Provincial View of Global Imbalances: Re-
gional Capital Flows in China,” University of Zurich Department of Economics
Working Paper, no. 162, 2014.
[97] G. Boyreau-Debray and S.-J. Wei, “Pitfalls of a State-dominated Financial
System: The Case of China,” 2005, working paper.
[98] C. Li, “Savings, Investment, and Capital Mobility within China,” China Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 14–23, 2010.
[99] K. S. Chan, V. Q. Dang, J. T. Lai, and I. K. Yan, “Regional Capital Mobility
in China: 1978–2006,” Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 30,
no. 7, pp. 1506–1515, 2011.
[100] J. T. Lai, P. D. McNelis, and I. K. Yan, “Regional Capital Mobility in China:
Economic Reform with Limited Financial Integration,” Journal of International
Money and Finance, vol. 37, pp. 493–503, 2013.
[101] K. Chan, J. Lai, and I. Yan, “Is the Provincial Capital Market Segmented in
China?” Review of Development Economics, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 430–446, 2013.
[102] L. Brandt, T. Tombe, and X. Zhu, “Factor Market Distortions across Time,
122
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Space and Sectors in China,” Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.
39–58, 2013.
[103] Z. M. Song and G. L. Wu, “Identifying Capital Misallocation,” 2014, working
paper.
[104] J. Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform. Texere,
2005.
[105] D. T. Yang and W. Li, “The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central
Planning Disaster,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, no. 4, pp. 840–877,
2005.
[106] J. Y. Lin, “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China,” American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 34–51, 1992.
[107] Y. Qian, “How Reform Worked in China,” 2002, William Davidson Working
Paper Number 473.
[108] K. M. Murphy, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, “The transition to a market
economy: Pitfalls of partial reform,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 889–
906, 1992.
[109] L. J. Lau, Y. Qian, and G. Roland, “Pareto-improving economic reforms




[110] ——, “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Ap-
proach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 120–
143, 2000.
[111] C.-T. Hsieh and Z. M. Song, “Grasp the large, let go of the small: the trans-
formation of the state sector in China,” 2015, working paper.
[112] B. Wang and D. T. Yang, “Volatility and Economic Regimes: Evidence from a
Large Transitional Economy,” 2015, working paper.
[113] Y. Wu, “China’s Capital Stock Series by Region and Sector,” 2009, working
paper.
[114] M. O. Ravn and H. Uhlig, “On Adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott Filter for the
Frequency of Observations,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 84, no. 2,
pp. 371–380, 2002.
[115] J. Wu and R. Zhao, “The Dual Pricing System in China’s Industry,” Journal
of Comparative Economics, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 309–318, 1987.
[116] T. T.-L. Chong, L. Lu, and S. Ongena, “Does Banking Competition Alleviate
or Worsen Credit Constraints Faced by Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises?




[117] G. Benigno and C. Thoenissen, “Equilibrium Exchange Rates and Supply-side
Performance,” Economic Journal, vol. 113, no. 486, pp. 103–124, 2003.
125
Vita
I was born in a southwest city, which is called the “Spring
city”, in China in 1986. I received my B.A. in finance and
B.S. in applied math from Beijing University in 2008. I
received my M.Phil. in economics from the Chinese Univer-
sity of Hong Kong in 2010. My thesis at the Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong won the Best Thesis Reward in the
economics department in 2010. I started my Ph.D. study at
Johns Hopkins University in 2010. My research focuses on
the pattern of capital flows and its relationship with saving and regime changes. My
job market paper has been selected by the EconCon 2015. My research also examines
the relationship between output volatility and economic transition. My paper with
Dennis Tao Yang on this topic won the Gregory Chow Best Paper Award at the 2015
CES North America Conference. My papers have already been published in journals
such as Economics Letters and Papers in Regional Science.
126
